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ABSTRACT

International Relations theory includes realist concepts of sovereign nation-states
interacting in an anarchic world as they rationally determine their own national interests
based upon ever-changing competition for power. In this interplay for power, nationstates may affect each other politically, economically, ideologically or militarily. This
thesis focuses on effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention in Guatemala in the
time period surrounding the Guatemalan Revolution (1944-1954), with its “liberation” in
1954, and then into the early 1960s as the Guatemalan state began to be militarized. In this

thesis I will answer the following question:
How did the United States affect the sovereign nation of Guatemala,
through economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations
and thereby contribute to and facilitate the establishment of the nature
of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state?
Through historically documented and officially acknowledged events an assessment will
be made as to how these three elements singularly and also collectively influenced the

internal workings of the Guatemalan state.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Foundational principles in Political Science and International Relations include
concepts such as the sovereignty of the individual nation-state, with concerns of national
security within each nation. These theories can be at odds with what happens in the real
world. A prime example of this is Guatemala, where power politics–economic power,
military power and ideological power of the United States–all affected another sovereign
nation. Many people believe that the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention
efforts set in motion the tragic situation in Guatemala resulting in what some members of
the international community conclude was genocide.
In Richard N. Adams’ study in Guatemalan social anthropology Crucifixion by
Power, he acknowledges the understanding that the nation-state is the basic unit of
investigation. He says that in a world of sovereign nations, the nation-state claims
ultimate authority in wielding power within its own domains (Adams 1970, p 4-5).
Sovereignty of the individual nation-state is considered to be an absolute right, one which
seeks to ensure full interior autonomy and independence from external forces, this
according to C. Neale Ronning in his “Intervention, International Law, and the InterAmerican System” (Ronning 1961, p 252). Ronning emphasizes this idea with this quote
from the Sixth International Conference of American States (1928): “No state has a right
to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251). “If that right is not
1

consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical harmony does
not exist” (Ronning 1961, p 252).
These concepts are identified and defined within the field of Political Science and
International Relations. It is understood that intervention in another nation-state is
considered to be a threat to its independence. In spite of this, officially sanctioned
historical accounts as well as actual U.S. Government documents demonstrate clear
evidence that the U.S. Government was responsible for a number of events in Guatemala
surrounding the 1954 coup d’état and throughout Guatemala’s civil war (1960-1996).
The U.S. involvement which affected the internal governance of the sovereign nation of
Guatemala can be considered through a number of objectives. In his article “U.S.
Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954”
Gordon L. Bowen observes the controversy which arises among scholars in their
differing views on which of several U.S. roles in Guatemala might be understood to be
the most significant. He points out that for some people, U.S. economic motivations
seem most important. Other people stress the importance of the evolution of anticommunist doctrine. Bowen’s analysis takes a third direction which deals with military
institutions as guarantors of U.S. foreign policy objectives (Bowen 1983, p 88-89).
Another undeniable influence is land reform.
Scholarly works and historical accounts characterize the Guatemalan civil war
(1960-1996) as what was one of the longest and bloodiest in the Western Hemisphere
(Jonas 2000, p 17). Extensive research has been conducted through first hand
testimonials carried out by a number of impartial organizations. For instance, the
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH or Comisión para el Esclarecimiento
2

Historico), a truth and reconciliation commission, was established through the Accord of
Oslo in 1994 “to clarify with objectivity, equity and impartiality, the human rights
violations and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused
suffering among the Guatemalan people”. The task of the Commission was not to judge,
but rather to clarify the history of more than three decades of fratricidal war (Guatemala
Memory of Silence 1999, Prologue). From these efforts came the March 1999 report
“Guatemala Memory of Silence”. One of the CEH report’s conclusions is that the
number of Guatemalans killed or disappeared during this confrontation exceeded 200,000
(Guatemala Memory of Silence 1999, Conclusions I. 2).
In his Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle
for Peace, Noam Chomsky names a factor which he says is often missing when assessing
relations between the United States and other countries. That missing element is an
historical identification and analysis of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.
intervention on the internal governance of individual sovereign nations. Chomsky
contends that features of the United States’ international behavior are often suppressed,
ignored or denied (Chomsky 1985, p 1). He perceives that “reality is often concealed or
deformed by the reigning doctrinal system, which pervades the media, journals of opinion
and much of scholarship” (Chomsky 1985, p 1).
In consideration of the CEH and other similar reports, new information from
recently declassified documents, and scholarly work which has been done throughout
history regarding the 1954 Guatemalan coup and civil war, I have chosen to research the
Central American country of Guatemala. This I do in partial response to Chomsky’s
observation of the gap in knowledge which I believe also exists in the case of Guatemala.
3

With this thesis I will identify and analyze various effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.
intervention on the internal governance of the sovereign nation of Guatemala. I will
explore these effects in the time period following World War II, throughout Guatemala’s
“Ten Years of Spring” (1944-1954), with the resultant “liberation”/coup d’état of 1954,
and then during the early part of the Cold War into the 1960s.
Why would it be important to research the events of the Guatemalan civil war so
many years after the fact? Susanne Jonas has a long record of academic research on the
history of Guatemala. In her The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S.
Power she articulates the view that Guatemala has been profoundly shaped by the Central
Intelligence Agency intervention of 1954 and also by subsequent interventions by the
United States. Similarly to Chomsky, Jonas expresses concern that the “fruits of those
interventions have been veiled in a vast shroud of silence in the U.S. press and public
domain” (Jonas 1991, p 2). It is because of this that she felt an obligation to write for U.S.
audiences about Guatemala.
In view of past scholarly research of U.S. intervention in Guatemala both pre- and
post- Guatemalan civil war, and more recent research from organizations and the CEH
truth and reconciliation commission, there is much to learn about the historical roots of
that armed confrontation. The CEH report recognizes that the Guatemalan civil war and
militarization of that country did not take place through a simple progression of history
(Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13). The report determined that the
Cold War and National Security Doctrine of the United States fed the armed
confrontation and the militarization of the Guatemalan state and society (Guatemala
Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13, 14 and 37).
4

It is because of what may be residual effects of mid-20th century intervention by
the United States in Guatemala that I feel drawn to research this topic. In considering
academic work from various sources, there are a number of distinctions in Guatemalan
history which I find compelling. For instance, it has been historically documented and
officially acknowledged that the United States has been directly involved in and has
influenced Guatemalan internal affairs. Of particular note is involvement of the United
States in the CIA sponsored coup d’état which replaced the democratically-elected
government of Guatemala in 1954. Many scholars contend that it was after this coup that
U.S. participation and guidance helped to set the stage for the Guatemalan civil war.
An excerpt from The National Security Archive notes the distinction of
Guatemala being the country in which the CIA carried out its first covert operation in
Latin America (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). Diplomatic historian Nicholas
Cullather identifies this as Operation PBSUCCESS. From Cullather’s access to agency
records and secret operation files, his overview describes PBSUCCESS as an account of
how President Eisenhower came to be convinced to order the forceful removal of a
democratically-elected leader, due to Cold War concerns (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997,
Document 5). Various scholars posit that U.S. financing and planning helped to shape
governance and leadership in Guatemala.
Jonas points out that Guatemala has been called the “laboratory” where counterinsurgency in Latin America was developed (Jonas 1991, p 71). She calls it a “test case” in
suppression of Latin American social revolution (Jonas 1991, p 9). Some scholars
express their belief that it did not take long for the same types of U.S. foreign policy and
intervention to affect other countries after Guatemala. Jonas opines that the tactics
5

developed in Guatemala later became standard operating procedure in counterinsurgency
wars throughout a number of countries in the hemisphere (Jonas 2000, p. 120).
Jonas identifies Guatemala as the first country to experience death squads and
“disappearances” which actually targeted the Guatemalan civilian population (Jonas
1991, p 71). In considering the truth commission reports, both the CEH and the report of
the Guatemalan Archdiocesan Project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory
(REMHI), Rachel May attests to the “brutal nature of the violence perpetuated by the
state” of Guatemala (torture, disappearance, massacres) (May 2001, p 13). She classifies
Guatemala as “one of the world’s most tragic cases of civil conflict and state-sponsored
terrorism in the late 20th century” (May 2001, p 13). May asserts that the “state took on
the characteristics of a terrorist regime, and that the state is responsible for the commission of genocide” (May 2001, p 14).
Learning of these distinctions compelled me to become more knowledgeable
about Guatemalan-U.S. history. This knowledge could provide a deeper understanding
and promote awareness to effectively lift part of the “shroud of silence” which Jonas has
perceived. From these distinctions, and inspired by the factor which Chomsky previously
identified as missing, that is, historical identification and analysis of the effects of U.S.
foreign policy and intervention on internal governance of individual sovereign nations, I
am motivated to ask the following thesis question:
How did the United States affect the sovereign nation of Guatemala,
through economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations
and thereby contribute to and facilitate the establishment of the nature
of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state?
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This question can be generalized as follows: What were the effects of the United
States on the economy and the governance of Guatemala? What were the effects on land
tenure and proposed land reform? How did the United States project perceptions of a
communist threat onto Guatemala and to what effect? Did the United States play a role
in militarizing Guatemala? Is Jonas’ contention correct that intervention by the United
States through these components singularly or collectively helped to set the stage for the
Guatemalan civil war?
I will attempt to answer these questions through a case study of Guatemala. I will
consider aspects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in three general categories:
economic, Cold War communist containment rationale, and then militarization of Guatemala. These aspects must be put in context both within Guatemala internally, and also
considered through external effects–for the purposes of this paper, primarily effects from
the United States. To those ends this thesis will begin with background information on
the state of the world economy (macro) and then move toward Guatemala’s internal
(micro) economy.
Whole societies or nations (macro units) can be studied using concepts such as
democracy, sovereignty and nonintervention, however these concepts are often identified
and recorded as experienced by Anglo-Americans (Chilcote 1994, p 372). Some scholars
don’t see these generalized concepts as very useful. Ronald H. Chilcote claims that the
study of politics is muddled in its terminology and so meanings must be clarified
(Chilcote 1994, p 374). Clarification can take place through case studies as they are
helpful in observing deviations from established conceptual generalizations. Models
bring parts together and demonstrate relationships. Models can simplify representations
7

of what is happening in reality (Chilcote 1994, p 372). In using Guatemala as a model, it
can be observed whether or not Guatemala’s sovereignty was respected by the United
States. Through a single case study during a specific time period one can observe political
activity and indicators of intervention through empirical interrelationships between
Guatemala and the United States.
To make these observations, this thesis provides content analysis using existing
research along with primary documents. Some of the primary documents which I use
come from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. I used excerpts from the
CIA archives (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866) text of the Hearings before the Subcommittee
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in regards to the “Communist Threat to the
United States through the Caribbean”. I also used another Department of State
Publication regarding “Intervention of International Communism to Guatemala”
(Department of State Publication 5556, 1954). My declassified CIA sources on the
Guatemalan destabilization program came from The National Security Archive available
through George Washington University.
The analysis in this exploratory study will be qualitative in nature, not
quantitative, and largely descriptive (Chilcote 1994, p 373). Specific observations of
U.S. foreign policy and intervention will be used inductively to infer generalizations
(Chilcote 1994, p 370). Chilcote states that methodology guides inquiry and the search
for solutions to problems in the real world (Chilcote 1994, p 3). He predicates that
methodology gives shape to inquiry. Concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention are
well formulated. These can be observed qualitatively, as can be demonstrated through
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intervention or nonintervention. “Dissimilar patterns of behavior become important in
the study of politics” (Chilcote 1994, p 370). From specific observations one can
conclude whether or not the United States intervened in Guatemala.
Political phenomena have been studied including government and governmental
institutions, but a broader range can also be observed in other types of organizations
(Chilcote 1994, p 3). Politics can be assessed looking at many forms of political activity–
governmental as well as nongovernmental (Chilcote 1994, p 4). The title of Chilcote’s
book indicates that he is “search(ing) for a paradigm” in reconsidering political science
and comparative politics. Chilcote’s work moves past mainstream theories of system and
state, political culture, development and underdevelopment, and theories of class. His
search leads him to the study of political economy (Chilcote 1994, p 363). Chilcote uses
the definition of political economy as a “social science dealing with the interrelationship
of political and economic processes” (Chilcote 1994, p 340). He observes comparative
politics and argues that “the study of politics cannot be isolated from social and economic
questions” (Chilcote 1994, p 12).
In looking at political economy theories, Chilcote delineates varied emphases on
theories such as imperialism, dependency and underdevelopment amongst others
(Chilcote 1994, p 12). He sees these as a means of organizational arrangement around
political economy. He calls attention to the fact that the idea of political economy is not
new, as Karl Marx’s “Das Kapital” is actually subtitled “A Critique of Political
Economy” and deals with commodities, money, surplus value and accumulation of
capital (Chilcote 1994, p 340). Chilcote makes note of Marx’s questioning of commonly
accepted concepts regarding liberated individuals in free competition (Chilcote 1994,
9

p 340). In Marx’s examination of the state, in the times in which he lived, Marx
differentiated between the state and civil society, and saw these as being separated in a
system which was reinforced by capitalism (Chilcote 1994, p 341). Chilcote observes
that Marx and Engels looked at the state in relation to the productive base of society. He
saw the “Division of labor and private property tend to promote contradictions between
individual and community interests so that the latter takes on an independent form as the
state separates from the real interests of individual and community” (Chilcote 1994,
p 341). We will observe an example of this type of contradiction as we consider how the
Guatemalan state represented its majority population, the indigenous people, in matters of
land ownership, their well-being, and in civic action such as voting.
In assessing social science and government in Latin America, Chilcote notes that
“connections between U.S. universities and defense and national security projects
constituted gross violations of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of
other countries” (Chilcote 1994, p 41). In his assessment Chilcote tries to elucidate
connections among government, the academic world, and multinational corporations
(Chilcote 1994, p 47). He writes that ideological assumptions permeate political science
and comparative politics, and these assumptions also affect policies and actions of
governments, universities and the corporate world (Chilcote 1994, p 47). The values and
beliefs of political scientists are tied to and reflect the world around them, where the
capitalistic world has been most prevalent. In recognizing the interplay of ideological
relationships in these various fields this paper considers not only nation-states as actors,
but broadens the perspective to include news media, clergy, and corporations such as the
United Fruit Company in Guatemala.
10

International political economy includes theories of imperialism and dependency.
Chilcote also observes inclusiveness of non-state actors as analysis turned “from
competitive capitalism to monopoly and oligopoly and assessed the role of the giant
corporations and their managers” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He assesses ideas relevant to
U.S. foreign policy and its impact on the expansion of U.S. business. Chilcote considers
scholarship on “the coincidence of the military and political presence of the United States
overseas, the dominant position of U.S. capital in the multinationals, and the dominance
of multinational banking” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). Chilcote directs inquiry toward
imperialistic tendencies of the United States through U.S. aid and trade. These impacts of
varied forms of U.S. foreign policy and intervention are included as subjects of this thesis
on Guatemala.
In my attempts at answering the aforementioned questions I will not provide an
event-by-event history, but rather I will identify individual historic actions and
interventions by the United States. I will then analyze the effects of U.S. foreign policies
and interventions on the sovereign nation of Guatemala.

11

CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review

Scholars define international politics as the effort made by one state or non-state
international actor, to influence another international actor in some way (Dougherty and
Pfalzgraff 2001, p 20-21). Dougherty and Pfalzgraff note that this influence may come in
the form of actual or threatened military force, or it may come from inducements, be they
economic or political. The international system is macrocosmic or global, made up of
micro units of nation-states (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 2001, p 31). As the world has
globalized there has been discussion as to the continued centrality of the nation-state,
however, the nation-state has remained the central unit of analysis. Nation-states will be
the primary units of analysis in this case study, however, politics can be assessed looking
at many forms of political activity–governmental as well as nongovernmental (Chilcote
1994, p 4).
History has focused on the nation-state as sovereign, that is, as independent and
with its own imperative for self-determination (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 2001, p 13).
Within this international system, Hans J. Morgenthau posits that states are rational actors
who use power in seeking their own national interests and security. National interests and
security can be understood in a number of ways, as we will see in this thesis.
Knowledge of history is necessary in international relations so as to broaden
theory. For this reason I have chosen to do a case study on Guatemalan history which
12

spans the time period surrounding its Ten Years of Spring or revolutionary period (19441954), during the 1954 coup d’état, throughout the governance of Colonel Carlos Castillo
Armas, and into the early 1960s. This thesis will consider three thematic impacts of the
United States on the politics of Guatemala, those being effects felt through economic
policy, Cold War rationale, and then early stages of militarization of Guatemala. These can
be considered singularly or in combination, as U.S. foreign policy during this time took
place within the context of the Cold War.
In assessing the impacts of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on the nationstate of Guatemala, this literature review will present varied concepts from the field of
Political Science and International Relations. We will consider foundational scholarship
of realist principles through power politics and the concept of national interest. We will
look at key components of theories of imperialism and repercussions of imperial control.
We will consider national sovereignty through differing perspectives on intervention.
Next we will look at the work of three prominent scholars on Guatemalan history who
will chronicle background information on Guatemala-U.S. relations during the mid-20th
century. This review will examine the ideas of another scholar who considers what may
be the underlying cause of intervention in Latin America that is the concept of “American
exceptionalism”. Another author describes Cold War logic in inter-American relations as
being headed up by U.S. political leadership. We will counterpose these ideas with two
other authors, one who contends that people in the United States perceive human beings
in Latin America as people who are “beneath” them. The second author is a former
President of Guatemala who held office during some of the years of this case study
period. Since much of history during this time was lost to the American public this
13

President’s 1961 letter “to the American reader” will provide a Guatemalan perspective of
U.S. foreign policy near to the time of the 1954 coup d’état and shortly thereafter.
In looking at this information through the lens of a case study on Guatemala, a
particular U.S.-Guatemala history about which many Americans were not and may not be
aware, this literature review ends with an author who puts forth a challenge of sorts. He
asks that we learn about U.S. geopolitical conceptions and institutional structures whose
resultant actions have contributed to oppression and misery in other parts of the world.
He calls upon us to inform ourselves and simply be honest about past history. This case
study on Guatemala provides but one tragic example from which Americans may learn.

On Realism and National Interest

Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, and James E. Dougherty and
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.’s Contending Theories of International Relations. Hans J.
Morgenthau is credited as having impacted political realist theory more than any other
person in the 20th century (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 75). Realist concepts
include self-interest/national interest which is determined rationally through power, and
balance of power relationships. These relationships take place in what is assumed to be
an anarchic world. Within the scope of international relations where nation-states are the
central actors, this equates to making rational determinations about political acts and their
consequences based upon historical data (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). It is
understood that historical evidence bears out the view that political leaders determine
national interest based upon power. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff offer Morgenthau’s
14

interpretation as follows: “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase
power, or to demonstrate power” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77).
According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, international politics are understood
through national interests in a process based upon diplomacy or war. Sovereign nations
compete for power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). Foreign policy is based on
survival at a minimum; national interest corresponds with national survival (Dougherty
and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 76). Since the world is comprised of nations in an anarchic global
setting, with national interest as the goal, the guiding principle is the struggle for power.
“Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the
actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered
through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau 1978, p 10).
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff explain that the morality of nation-states is understood to
differ from individual morality. State morality is judged by political consequences. They
posit that Morgenthau did not ignore ethical or moral considerations. They believe that
Morgenthau “could envisage no conception of national interest that would condone
policies of mass extermination, torture, and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian
populations in war” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They theorize that
Morgenthau believed that ethics could restrain political conduct. Their analysis posits
that if international politics are framed in terms of power, as can be seen in Morgenthau’s
words “we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own” (Morgenthau 1978,
p 11).
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff put forth that national policies are designed to seek to
preserve the status quo, to achieve expansion through imperialism, or to gain prestige
15

(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They use the Monroe Doctrine as an example of
a policy which was designed to maintain the status quo balance in the Western hemisphere. This thesis will demonstrate but one example of an effort by the United States
toward maintaining the status quo in Guatemala. This they do through ideology, and
economic and military power.

On Imperialism

Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy’s book deals
with national and international power and how strong nations have risen and fallen over
the centuries. He describes his work as “interaction between economics and strategy” as
powerful states work toward enhancing or maintaining their own wealth and power
(Kennedy 1987, p xv). He explains that the term “military conflict” from the book’s
subtitle must be examined in terms of economic change. He views the leading nations’
relative strengths as ever-changing (Kennedy 1987, p xv). In looking at the course of
history he finds that the rise and fall of leading countries shows a long-term correlation
between “productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength
on the other” (Kennedy 1987, p xvi). This book looks at continuous interplay between
strategy and economics in both peacetime and war (Kennedy 1987, p xxi). Kennedy
offers this book to fill in a gap he sees in the study of shifts of economic and strategic
power balances (Kennedy 1987, p xxv). Kennedy moves through history detailing
politics of Eurocentric leading powers over 500 years. For purposes of this thesis we
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look at his chapter on the 20th century bipolar world of the USSR and the United States
with their Cold War ideological and economic differences (Kennedy 1987, p xx).
In looking at the imperialistic atmosphere of the early 1900s, Kennedy highlights
the arrogance and ambitions of western imperialism. He believes that it brought with it
seeds of its own destruction (Kennedy 1987, p 392). He notes that western imperialists
accepted nationalism and self-determination for certain countries and “civilized” people
(e.g. eastern Europeans) but these principles were not acceptable where the “imperialist
powers extended their territories and held down independence movements” (Kennedy
1987, p 392). We will see in this thesis an example of the United States extending its
influence to hold down the efforts toward independence and reform in Guatemala.
Kennedy writes that with 20th century power politics came a new trend, that of
political fragmentation of the globe (Kennedy 1987, p 392). He discerns that as empires
were being shattered, the forces of change resulted in what would be called the Third
World. This reference to “third” world he postulates came about because “it insisted on
its distinction from the American- and Russian-dominated blocs” (Kennedy 1987, p 392).
He says that these countries were still tied to the superpowers, but they had other concerns: decolonization, concentration on issues other than the Cold War, and promotion of
world change away from economic dominance by white men (Kennedy 1987,
p 392-393).
In looking at the Cold War and the Third World, Kennedy states that one major
element was the arms race between the two blocs and the creation of military alliances to
support either side (Kennedy 1987, p 383). This U.S.-Russian rivalry created a competition to find new partners, or to prevent Third World countries from allying themselves
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with the other power (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Kennedy says that early on this was more
an American activity because of its post-1945 advantageous position, while the USSR
was trying to rebuild after war. He points out for instance that the United States had
outside garrisons and air bases. Kennedy describes “the view from Washington. . . that a
master plan for world Communist domination was unfolding, step by step, and needed to
be ‘contained’” (Kennedy 1987, p 389).
During this time many countries were looking for economic and military support
from Washington (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Even so, Kennedy observes that at this same
time the Third World was coming of age, as they were ridding themselves of the control
of previous European empires. Many of these countries did not want to become mere
satellites of superpowers, even if they could receive economic or military aid (Kennedy
1987, p 392).
The author insinuates that the Great Powers had to grapple with the fact that their
universalist message was not automatically accepted by every other country in the world
(Kennedy 1987, p 392). We will see one example of this independent thought process in
the work of Juan José Arévalo in his The Shark and the Sardines.

Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback. This book’s subtitle, “The Costs and Consequences of American Empire” indicates what Johnson says is the subject of this book,
that is the nature of a remaining empire and how this has changed over time (Johnson
2000, p 20). In this book Johnson moves away from more traditional definitions of
imperialism which include extending rule or authority over foreign countries, holding
colonies, or simply extending one’s state dominion over other nation-states. He deepens
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his modern definition of imperialism to include “ideological or juridical concept(s)–
commonwealth, alliance, free world, the West, the Communist bloc–that disguises the
actual relationship among its members” (Johnson 2000, p 19-20). According to Johnson
these new empires come with an imposition of a social system (Johnson 2000, 19-20).
So what is “blowback”? Johnson defines blowback as “shorthand for saying that
a nation reaps what it sows, even if it does not fully know or understand what it has
sown” (Johnson 2000, p 223). Johnson predicts that world politics which took place in
the 20th century will have blowback effects in the 21st century (Johnson 2000, p 229).
These, he believes, are tangible costs of being an empire (Johnson 2000, p 223).
In spite of the United States’ substantial military and economic tools, and sense of
invulnerability, Johnson foresees that blowback effects will be felt within the United
States (Johnson 2000, p 223). He notes however that blowback is not only a problem for
the United States as the sole imperial power. He describes the United States as the
primary source of secret operations which hold up repressive regimes, and the world’s
largest weapons seller, as well as the world’s most prominent target for blowback
(Johnson 2000, p 11-12).
Johnson reasons that people who live in imperialist countries have short memories
of their imperial acts, however the memories of those at the receiving end of imperialistic
power have long memories. For instance, he contends that nations which have
perpetuated acts of genocide will be recipients of blowback. This would include some
Central American countries and, for the purposes of this thesis, Guatemala.
In his discussions on Central America, Johnson indicates how, in that geographical area, the United States historically behaved no better than the other superpower who
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he refers to as Communist bureaucrats (Johnson 2000, p 229). He writes that both
superpowers used Cold War rhetoric to justify their actions against smaller states (Johnson 2000, p 27). As he lists Guatemala as one of the countries affected by the U.S.
anticommunist rhetoric, he denotes the idea of communism in Central America as “essentially absurd”. He points to the existence of propaganda apparatuses which disguised the
“true roots of revolt” from their own people (Johnson 2000, p 27).
In regards to Guatemala, he writes that the U.S. CIA planned and organized the
1954 military coup as a result of modest land reform which threatened U.S. corporations
(Johnson 2000, p 13-14). He sees this as a “striking example of American imperial
policies” in its backyard (Johnson 2000, p 13).

Ronald H. Chilcote’s Theories of Comparative Politics. The subtitle of Ronald
H. Chilcote’s book indicates a “search for a paradigm” in political science and comparative politics which he believes leads to the study of political economy (Chilcote 1994,
p 363). Chilcote compartmentalizes comparative politics theoretical direction into
theories of system and state, political culture, development and underdevelopment, and
theories of class. He summarizes and critiques each and challenges scholars to move past
mainstream ideas, toward alternative approaches such as political economy (Chilcote
1994, p 339). Chilcote uses the definition of political economy as a “social science
dealing with the interrelationship of political and economic processes” (Chilcote 1994, p
340). He stresses comparative political economy as he observes comparative politics and
argues for assimilation of political questions. He writes that “the study of politics cannot
be isolated from social and economic questions” (Chilcote 1994, p 12).
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In looking at political economy theories, Chilcote delineates varied emphases on
theories such as imperialism, and dependency and underdevelopment amongst others
(Chilcote 1994, p 12). He sees these as a means of organizational arrangement around
political economy. He notes that the idea of political economy is not new, as Karl Marx’s
“Das Kapital” is actually subtitled “A Critique of Political Economy” (Chilcote 1994,
p 340). This work deals with commodities, money, surplus value and accumulation of
capital. Chilcote notes Marx’s questioning of commonly accepted concepts of liberated
individuals in free competition (Chilcote 1994, p 340). In Marx’s examination of the
state, in the times in which he lived, Marx differentiated between the state and civil
society, and saw these as being separated in a system reinforced by capitalism (Chilcote
1994, p 341).
Chilcote observes that Marx and Engels looked at the state in relation to the
productive base of society and saw the “Division of labor and private property tend to
promote contradictions between individual and community interests so that the latter
takes on an independent form as the state separates from the real interests of individual
and community” (Chilcote 1994, p 341). We will observe an example of this in looking
at the Guatemalan state along with the needs of the majority Guatemalan population, the
indigenous people, in issues of land ownership, well-being of the populace, and in civic
action such as voting.
For Marx, an examination of interrelationships in material production is
necessary. Chilcote writes of Engels’ and Marx’s ideas that: “The base or economic
structure of society becomes the real foundation on which people enter into essential
relations over which they exercise little control. In contrast, the legal and political
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superstructure is a reflection of that base, and changes in the economic foundation bring
about transformations in the superstructure” (Chilcote 1994, p 342). Chilcote notes that
comparative politics were traditionally directed at the role of government and state, and
after the 1950s, some specialists turned instead toward the concept of political system.
Taking such different approaches opened up discussion on imperialism and dependency,
and consequent analysis of nations as seen as developed and underdeveloped (Chilcote
1994, p 342-343), and peripheral and core.
Chilcote looks for an holistic approach, and indeed he finds Marxist theory as
“holistic, broadly ranged, unified and interdisciplinary in contrast to the ahistorical,
compartmentalized, and often narrow parameters of the mainstream paradigm” (Chilcote
1994, p 343). He finds that Marxist study relative to political economy unites and
synthesizes elements (Chilcote 1994, p 344), this in agreement with Chilcote’s advocacy
for synthesis in understanding and explanation of societal problems. Chilcote believes
that “the study of politics should be combined with economics” (Chilcote 1994, p 345).
In regards to theories of international political economy and theories of
imperialism and dependency, Chilcote notes that analysis turned “from competitive
capitalism to monopoly and oligopoly and assessed the role of the giant corporations and
their managers” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He considers work on “U.S. foreign policy and
its impact on the international expansion of U.S. business” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). He
looks at “the coincidence of the military and political presence of the United States
overseas, the dominant position of U.S. capital in the multinationals, and the dominance
of multinational banking” (Chilcote 1994, p 357). Amongst Chilcote’s work is emphasis
on imperialistic tendencies of the United States through U.S. aid and trade.
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On Sovereignty and Intervention

C. Neale Ronning’s “Intervention, International Law, and the InterAmerican System”. According to Ronning, no clearer statements on the doctrine of
absolute sovereignty can be found than those presented in discussions at the Sixth International Conference of American States held in Cuba in 1928, which read as follows:
“No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251).
Further, Ronning provides an Argentine statement which he says represented almost
every Latin American delegation:
“Sovereignty of states is the absolute right of full interior autonomy and complete external independence. That right is guaranteed
to the strong nations by their power and to the weak through the
respect of the strong. If that right is not consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical harmony does not
exist. Intervention, diplomatic or armed, permanent or temporary,
threatens the independence of states.” (Ronning 1961, p 252).
Ronning says that the United States finds itself “astride” Latin American conflicts
in the last two decades (he was writing in 1961) and so non-intervention principles need
to be reconsidered (Ronning 1961, p 249). He sees much difficulty in failure to treat
international politics of Latin America as objective (Ronning 1961, p 250). In his understanding, “the problem of intervention in the Western Hemisphere has been viewed
almost exclusively as a struggle where Latin-American states were defending themselves
against intervention by the United States (and a few Great Powers in Europe) who sought
to protect powerful economic interests and promote imperialistic designs” (Ronning
1961, p 250).
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Ronning has little doubt that principles of non-intervention are fundamental to the
inter-American system, and that American governments are “well aware that they are
breaking the law when the resort to intervention” (Ronning 1961, p 269). In spite of this,
for the 20 years previous to Ronning’s article he estimates that there were more cases of
intervention in Central America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in the world
outside of the Soviet sphere (Ronning 1961, p 269).
Regarding post World War II events, Ronning looks at Latin America. He makes
note of growing social and political unrest and movements demanding fundamental
change in the structure of society, such as political democracy and respect for human
rights, and also “freeing the downtrodden masses from their economic and social bondage” (Ronning 1961, p 258). He states that these changes would deal with previous
patterns of oligarchy and foreign control. He also asserts that totalitarian ideology was
spread by clandestine subversive intervention.
Ronning recognizes U.S. concerns for its own security and says that when U.S.
security is being threatened, or “when it is convinced that it is”, it looks for ways to get
around principles of non-intervention (Ronning 1961, p 262). One such argument he
provided was from U.S. delegate to the convention, Charles Evans Hughes when he tried
to justify U.S. actions by contending that they were not intervention, but rather they were
warranted for the protection of lives and property of American nationals (Ronning 1961,
p 252).
In looking at the principles of nonintervention, and economic, social and political
developments in the region, Ronning cites what he calls “collisions”. He writes that “the
non-intervention doctrine confronts the facts of intervention, especially in Central
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America and the Caribbean” (Ronning 1961, p 249). He also observes intrusion by the
Cold War conflict, where he sees Cold War propaganda being used by both contenders as
they profess a life of abundance under their respective political and economic systems
(Ronning 1961, p 259).
Ronning calls Guatemala the prime example of intervention. He observes that
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had maneuvered at the Tenth Inter-American
Conference in 1954, with the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism
(Ronning 1961, p 262). Ronning points out that usage of this Declaration would give
basis for similar action in other parts of the hemisphere.
In this work Ronning surmises that conference discussions contained a warning
that “the principle of non-intervention, which was supposed to guarantee freedom and the
right of self-determination, might well become the very means by which tyranny would
be perpetuated” (Ronning 1961, p 252). Ronning concludes that the perspective of the
United States did not provide solutions to this dilemma, but instead a remedy of unilateral
intervention (Ronning 1961, p 253).
Ronning evaluates the United States looking primarily to its own security interests
(Dulles) as a short-sighted approach (Ronning 1961, p 271) because it fails to relate
hemispheric security to problems of economic and social well-being for Latin Americans
(Ronning 1961, p 271). He says that Latin America in general resents U.S. intervention
(Ronning 1961, p 251). Ronning contends that relating intervention exclusively to a
threat for one state or a group of states provides no results.
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“American Exceptionalism”, U.S. Political Leadership and Alternate Views

Samuel P. Huntington’s The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in
Foreign Policy, and Hans J. Morgenthau’s “Repression’s Friend”. Samuel P.
Huntington describes American involvement in the world as national interest and power
versus political morality and principles (Huntington 1981, p 3). He sees a difference
between the realists and the moralists (Huntington 1981, p 4). Austin Ranney describes
this publication as “the persistent, radical gap between the promise of American ideals,
and the performance of American politics” (Huntington 1981, Foreword). Huntington
recognizes antagonism between the American ideals of liberty, equality and hostility to
authority, and the institutions and hierarchies which are necessary to carry out these same
functions in a democratic society. He projects that these tensions will increase as time
goes on. For the purpose of my thesis on Guatemala, this resource emphasizes the
perceived need for U.S. power in world affairs to remain strong in order for liberty and
democracy to continue.
Huntington examines choices made by American policy makers while they deal
with the rest of the world (Huntington 1981, p 4). In his opinion, the conflict that
Americans perceived between power and liberty within the United States leads them to
project that same conflict as existing in countries outside of the United States. He notes
an assumption which follows this reasoning–American power in dealing with other
countries must also threaten liberty within those countries (Huntington 1981, p 4).
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Huntington highlights the words of Hans J. Morgenthau in looking at U.S.
involvement in the politics of other countries. Morgenthau refers to America as “Repression’s Friend” in a 1974 New York Times letter to the editor:
“With unfailing consistency, we have since the end of the Second
World War intervened (emphasis mine) on behalf of conservative
and fascist repression against revolution and radical reform. In an
age when societies are in a revolutionary or prerevolutionary stage,
we have become the foremost counterrevolutionary status quo
power on earth. Such a policy can only lead to moral and political
disaster” (New York Times, October 10, 1974, p 46).
In reaction to Morgenthau’s ideas, Huntington reasons that in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, right-wing regimes are more
susceptible to American/Western influence than left-wing dictatorships. He believes this
influence to lean toward “liberty” (Huntington 1981, p 4-5). He sees Morgenthau’s
reasoning as deficient. In Huntington’s view, U.S. influence in other societies in the mid1970s was decreasing, as only a “pale shadow” of what it was 25 years earlier.
Huntington goes on to credit the United States for the “imposition of democracy” on the
defeated Axis countries (Huntington 1981, p 5-6).
As for American influence in Latin American countries in the early 1960s,
Huntington also credits the United States for supporting free elections, something which
he believes results in political stability (Huntington 1981, p 6-7, 9). He recognizes U.S.
focus on economic aid, military assistance and training, and “propaganda efforts” in the
1960s. He sees the Alliance for Progress as the high point of democracy (Huntington
1981, p 7) for the United States during this time. During the 1970s he finds that a goal
was “lowered” to attempts to “induce authoritarian governments not to infringe too
blatantly the rights of their citizens” (Huntington 1981, p 9).
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It is Huntington’s contention that U.S. power is less likely to be misused or
corrupted than other governments. He attributes part of this to the American free press,
and also to Congress’ powers of investigation which he says limit the potential to violate
the values of American society (Huntington 1981, p 11). He talks of the “clean hands”
doctrine–which he takes to mean that the United States sets an example for others when it
keeps its own hands clean (Huntington 1981, p 12). He says “the power of example
works only when it is an example of power. . . No one copies a loser” (Huntington 1981,
p 13). For this reason he determines that liberty in the world is dependent upon the future
of American power; the promotion of liberty abroad means that American power must
grow (Huntington 1981, p 13).
Huntington writes about “American exceptionalism” and maintaining American
ideals and institutions (Huntington 1981, p 15). He concludes that threats to the future of
America can be reduced in a number of ways, one of which is to “believe in the universal
validity of American ideals but also understand their limited applicability to other societies” (Huntington 1981, p 16-17).
This resource is a good example of the roots of the attitudes of “American
exceptionalism” and possible explanations of U.S. actions during this time.

Peter H. Smith’s Talons of the Eagle. Peter H. Smith writes of “logic of interAmerican relations” primarily as understood by U.S. political leadership. In this book he
recognizes that Latin America was turned into a “battleground” through conflicts between
capitalism and communism (Smith 2008, p 113-114). The United States’ anti-communist
stance was to institutionalize military and political alliances within the Americas. It
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collaborated with and supported authoritarian regimes. It tried to crush leftist and communist governments. It orchestrated the military overthrow of democratically-elected
governments. All of this happened under the fear of a “Soviet menace”, a fear which
Smith says was greatly exaggerated (Smith 2008, p 113-114).
Author Smith says that the United States did not favor authoritarianism over
democracy, but rather it judged that dictatorial regimes would be more efficient against
communists. This idea Smith labeled as a “cold-blooded calculation” (Smith 2008, 125).
The Cold War thus proceeded not so much as a protection from extra-hemispheric threats,
but rather a purported justification to penetrate the domestic realms of individual nations’
politics (Smith 2008, 126). According to Smith the question was whether or not the
country was on “our side”, and if it was, effective dictators could expect continued
support from Washington.
George Kennan, chief architect of Soviet containment policy, saw three goals, the
first of which was the protection of “our (emphasis mine) raw materials”. U.S. producers
saw Latin America as a major potential export market, and also an area for financial
investment, thus, these ideas underlay U.S. policy. The second goal was the prevention
of military exploitation of Latin America by the enemy. Within this effort the United
States placed increasing emphasis on establishing contacts with militaries within Latin
American countries. The third goal was the prevention of psychological mobilization of
Latin America against the United States (Smith 2008, 121).
In regards to Latin America as part of the Third World, Smith notes the United
States acted from both outside, and also through interventions within domestic politics of
Latin American nations. Implicit in this U.S. understanding was that Latin American
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countries would simply have to accept change, this to assure their own survival (Smith
2008, 134). Latin American countries were to accept the notion of gradual reform and
not revolution. Revolution was seen by the United States as dangerous as it upset social
order and destroyed political institutions. The United States posited that revolution could
potentially lead to Marxist/communist gain. The United States preferred prevention of
revolution, which would presumably provide time for the processes of socioeconomic
modernization to take place. The United States preferred stability.
In Smith’s view, Cold War “promised neither victory nor peace” (Smith 2008,
117).

Lars Schoultz’s Beneath the United States. Lars Schoultz’s book recognizes the
following attitude which has existed on the part of people in the United States toward
Latin America: Latin America is considered to be “beneath” the United States. The
author attempts to explain the logic which underlies attitudes in the United States toward
Latin America. He says that these attitudes are borne of the U.S. objective to protect its
own interests. This is manifested in the manner in which the powerful nation, the United
States, treats its weaker neighbors to the south (Schoultz 1998, p xii).
Schoultz evaluates the enormous disparities in power and wealth between the
United States and Latin America. One indicator of this for him is the amount of money
that the United States spends each year to alter the behavior of its Latin American neighbors, while the converse is not true. He gives two examples. First, he says that the
United States monitors Latin American countries in their efforts to stop the flow of drugs
into the United States, but no Latin American countries research the efforts the United
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States is making to keep drug consumption down within its own borders (Schoultz 1998,
p xiii). Second, he says that the United States has its armed forces throughout Latin
America, while at the same time Americans don’t believe that the United States can learn
much of anything from the militaries in these other countries. This attitude he views as a
“fact of life” (Schoultz 1998, p xiii).
Schoultz calls this a hegemonic, one-way relationship, resulting from the realist
concept of self-interest. In his view, this self-interest “requires ever-increasing efforts to
influence the behavior of weaker people” (Schoultz 1998, p xiv). He acknowledges that
these attitudes were simply taken as understood until the Cold War ended. After that
time, the United States had to come up with new problems to continue its control in Latin
America.
Schoultz identifies unchanging interests which serve the United States– among
these are the nation’s security and also economic development. He recognizes the creation of formal organizations which protected U.S. economic and security interests. These
organizations directed U.S.-Latin American relationships throughout the Depression,
World War II and then the Cold War, the time period about which my thesis deals.
Schoultz’s book attempts to analyze the evolution of relationships between Latin
America and the United States. In considering the self-interested “unpolished collection
of beliefs” shared by many people in the United States, Schoultz attempts to broaden and
provide additional knowledge (Schoultz 1998, p xvii). This he says will help to uncover
beliefs which he perceives to preclude a policy based upon mutual respect (Schoultz
1998, p xvi). Schoultz recognizes negative attitudes toward Latin America as having
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been easily projected through U.S. influence on the Guatemalan economy and military,
through use of U.S. Cold War perceptions.

Historical Background of Guatemala-U.S. Relations

Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer’s Bitter Fruit. In this book the authors
reexamine the history around the 1954 Guatemalan coup with an emphasis toward U.S.
intervention. As the title denotes, they consider this an “American Coup”. In writing
this book they had at their disposal documents which had been opened up with the
Freedom of Information Act. This allowed them access to information on U.S. foreign
policy which had not been available before (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, Preface). For
instance, they were able to examine State Department, National Archives, FBI and Naval
Department documents. From this new documentation they provided in-depth information on U.S. foreign policy and conduct. Their work chronicles American influence
and intervention in the inner workings of what was considered but one of a number of
“banana republics”, the Guatemalan nation-state.
The authors chronicle the actions of early use of the U.S. CIA clandestine bureaucracy (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). This they see being used in the name of
National Security directives which presumably sought to keep communist encroachment
out of the Western hemisphere, and promote democratic ideology within. Another result
of this U.S. action kept the area safe for American interests. Bitter Fruit considers the
interests of the United States in contrast to the interests of the United Fruit Company. In
looking at purported U.S. efforts to keep communism out, the book also notes the exten32

sive negative consequences for the majority Guatemalan population. The newly accessible FOIA information provides details on U.S. efforts to remove the Guatemalan revolutionary government. It also provides a view into Guatemalan history and leadership after
the coup along with continued U.S. involvement toward nurturing “willing partners” in
Guatemalan governance who were much affected by U.S. foreign policy (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 247). The authors contend that the 1954 Guatemalan coup was the
“central episode in modern history of that country” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 254).

Richard H. Immerman’s The CIA in Guatemala. Immerman declares that in
writing this book he originally set out to “expose the perfidy of the CIA” (Immerman
1982, p ix). With the use of materials such as declassified FOIA documents, he broadened his original understanding of the U.S. intervention as being more than a covert
operation by the United States to defend the United Fruit Company. With his new
understanding, Immerman now comes to see the basis for the conflict as follows: “During the period of cold war tension, neither the United States government nor the public
could understand Guatemalans” (Immerman 1982, p ix). As he works through this
perceived misunderstanding, he cautions that what the United States considered a successful operation in 1954 may well come to be seen as a serious failure (Immerman 1982,
p ix).
The author’s scholarship provides background information on U.S. foreign
interests and Latin American policy within the framework of the Cold War. Through the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, he examines the road to intervention. He

33

assesses the preparation and details of Operation PBSUCCESS and then talks of its
legacies.
Immerman denotes the irony and legacy of PBSUCCESS as that of producing the
guerrilla struggle (Immerman 1982, p 200). In this book, more than 25 years after the
1954 coup, he looks at political violence in Guatemala, as he considers events in Iran, and
Nicaragua and El Salvador. From these Immerman concludes that “strong-arm tactics
can no longer control revolutionary change in Central America” (Immerman 1982,
p 201).
The legacy of PBSUCCESS is a dilemma to Immerman–one which he says was a
“dilemma of Washington’s own making” (Immerman 1982, p 197). He says that through
U.S. anti-communist policies, cold warriors had “returned to power the very elements of
society that had created the conditions that the 1944 revolution had tried to eradicate”
(Immerman 1982, p 197-198). Immerman quotes the words of U.S. diplomat William
O’Dwyer in his testimony in 1954 congressional hearings: “The foreign policy of the
United States is . . . on trial in Guatemala” (Immerman 1982, p 198).

Susanne Jonas’ The Battle for Guatemala. Another notable scholar on the
history of Guatemala during the 20th century is Susanne Jonas. In The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, Jonas’ scholarship examines the origins
of the Guatemalan civil war by looking at the changing economy and social structures,
with particular attention paid to repeated interventions by the United States in its policy
toward Guatemala. Jonas chronicles Guatemalan history moving from colonial legacies,
through the Guatemalan Revolution, the counterrevolution with its violence and repres34

sion, up until the publication of her book in 1991. She looks at critical events and also
considers changes in the ruling coalition as it moved toward military rule.
Jonas considers information on both internal Guatemalan influences, as well as
the effects of external U.S. policies on Guatemala. In taking a comprehensive analysis of
Guatemala’s internal factors, she emphasizes the importance of understanding that
Guatemala is a peripheral nation in the capitalist world system (Jonas 1991, p 6). Because of this, Guatemala is affected by and vulnerable to international factors, one of
which is influence of the United States. Jonas notes that for decades U.S. power played,
and continues to play, an essential role in Guatemala (Jonas 1991, p 6). She denotes three
protagonists in Guatemala: the “rebels”, the “death squads” who operate as part of the
official security forces, and the United States (Jonas 1991, p 6).
As a person who travelled to Guatemala beginning in the 1960s and was affected
by what she saw happening there, Jonas writes that she felt compelled to do something,
or at least to communicate to the public domain about what she had witnessed (Jonas
1991, p 1). In the shaping of Guatemala, she identifies U.S. interventions by the CIA as
profound (Jonas 1991, p 1). Among the effects she named were the CIA intervention of
1954, and then subsequent interventions after that. She refers to a revolutionary “crisis”
in Guatemala which she defines as the “breakdown of the social order and structures of
domination” (Jonas 1991, p 3).
Jonas does not offer her book as contemporary history but rather her goal is to
“interpret the Guatemalan experience” (Jonas 1991, p 3). She sees that in the 20 years
preceding this book, areas of theoretical inquiry had opened up or had expanded. These
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included studies of Guatemala’s indigenous population, and also scholarship related to
gender, class and ethnicity (Jonas 1991, p 3).
In her analysis Jonas sees Central America as part of the U.S. “backyard” and thus
U.S. military and economic interests play a part in the domestic ruling coalitions of these
countries (Jonas 1991, p 8). Jonas’ analysis uses strong language in describing U.S.
intervention and foreign policy in Guatemala. She says that the United States made
Guatemala into “a test case of its ability to suppress social revolution in Latin America”.
Guatemalan history from 1954 to the 1980s is described by Jonas as a “laboratory of
counterrevolution” (Jonas 1991, p 9).

Learn the History of Latin America

Noam Chomsky’s Turning the Tide. In this book Chomsky looks at historical
background and geopolitical conceptions of U.S. policy. He takes a broader look at U.S.
national security policy during the Cold War, and concludes that U.S. government programs don’t have much to do with security, but rather are concerned with power structures and the global concerns of dominant institutions (Chomsky 1985, p 2). His sees
opportunities for constructive work to make changes to the existing system.
This book was published a short time after what is considered by many people as
the bloodiest years of the Guatemalan civil war. Chomsky gives details of the gruesome
slaughter and genocide of that time, as per Amnesty International and British Parliamentary investigations (Chomsky 1985, p 28-29). Even so, he relates that U.S. President
Reagan and Elliott Abrams, his Human Rights specialist at the time, defended the strate36

gies, and Guatemala’s state security apparatus which was responsible for what Chomsky
calls crimes. He contends that U.S. policies and U.S. military force resources which were
used in Viet Nam, were also applied in Guatemala (Chomsky 1985, p 30). One such
example was the use of “strategic hamlets” as part of U.S. foreign policy in Viet Nam,
and the “auto defense units” which were modeled after those, in Guatemala. Chomsky
emphasizes that Elliott Abrams actually blamed the violence on the guerrillas who were
fighting the government. He says that the consequent violence and resultant mass of
people seeking refuge from the violence, were the “price of stability” (Chomsky 1985,
p 32). Many Guatemalans fled to Mexico at the time. Chomsky notes that the U.S. State
Department reported that democracy was on track, even in light of Americas Watch
observations that assassinations had doubled and abductions had quadrupled in Guatemala at the time (Chomsky 1985, p 32).
The author claims that the United States provided direct military assistance and
thereby facilitated those who tortured, murdered and brutalized the Guatemalan people
(Chomsky 1985, p 33). U.S. engineering of the 1954 coup, which restored military rule,
resulted in Guatemala turning into what he calls a literal hell on earth. Military assistance
was still being maintained by the United States at the publication of his book in 1985.
From this we can see that Chomsky came to the same conclusions as other scholars in
this thesis–the situation which existed in Guatemala was kept on course by U.S. intervention (Chomsky 1985, p 157).

Juan José Arévalo’s The Shark and the Sardines. A Guatemalan perspective on
what was happening in that country in the years after 1954 is encapsulated in the words
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of President Juan José Arévalo in his The Shark and the Sardines. This book contains a
letter from former President Arévalo and is addressed “To the American Reader”. In this
letter he warns Americans that his book is considered controversial. He communicates to
the American people that what he writes is not meant to cast blame on all North Americans, as he carefully distinguishes between the American government and the American
people. He says that he understands that the American people are also victims of “imperialist policy of promoting business, multiplying markets and hoarding money” (Arévalo
1961, p 9).
Arévalo’s letter credits the ideologies of the founding fathers of the United States
and notes their moral values (Arévalo 1961, p 10). He says that the world applauded
what was the new nation of the United States, but change came in the 20th century as the
White House adopted a different policy. Arévalo came to view the U.S. Government as
an “entrepreneur for business and protector of illicit commercial profits” (Arévalo 196,
p 10). With the advent of people like Rockefeller came greed (Arévalo 1961, p 10) says
Arévalo. He states that with these changes the United States. was no longer a state of
religion or law, but rather a mercantile state (Arévalo 1961, p 10).
Arévalo looks at his own country, Guatemala, and writes of the “international
scandal” (Arévalo 1961, p 11) when President Eisenhower and then U.S. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles assaulted his country through the 1954 coup d’état. In looking
at U.S. political activity in Latin America, Arévalo believes that the U.S. military
apparatus manipulated a system of local revolutions (Arévalo 1961, p 11). These he
believes were financed by Wall Street or the White House, which he considers to have
merged and were now working together. He notes that big business had changed North
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America as it now exploited and victimized Latin American countries and their people
(Arévalo 1961, p 10). This exploitation he says was done with shrewdness, coldness,
harshness and great arrogance (Arévalo 1961, p 11).
In light of what he lays out was happening in Latin America, he claims that people
there could not be friends with the government of the United States (Arévalo 1961, p 11).
Although he felt that friendship could be rebuilt, he maintains that the White House
would first have to view and treat Latin Americans differently.
Arévalo closes this Letter still referring to the North American people as friends.
He does however ask that they accept his words as a “voice of alarm” so that they may
make themselves aware of the many crimes which have been committed in the name of
the North American people (Arévalo 1961, p 13).

Freedom of Information Act and Declassified Information Sources

Official historical documentation, which was not available closer to the actual
events of Guatemalan history in the mid-20th century, has been made available more
recently through a number of sources. Schlesinger and Kinzer along with Immerman
note the availability of documents which they used in making requests for their research
through the Freedom of Information Act. New information sources at their disposal
included State Department, National Archives, FBI and Naval Department Documents.
My research also includes documents from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Historian. I used excerpts from the CIA archives (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866) text of the
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
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Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, in
regards to the “Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean”. I used
another Department of State Publication regarding “Intervention of International Communism to Guatemala” (Department of State Publication 5556, 1954). My declassified
CIA sources on the Guatemalan destabilization program came from The National
Security Archive available through George Washington University. Kate Doyle and Peter
Kornbluh’s information on “CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents”
was released by the CIA on May 23, 1997. Documents which I refer to from this source
come from the resultant National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, and
are identified by the word “Document” with numbered sections (e.g.–#1 from CIA
History Staff Analyst Gerald K. Haines; #2 “A Study of Assassination”; #5 from Staff
Historian Nicholas Cullather). Additionally, I used a White House Memorandum “Declaration of Castillo Armas” which was released by the CIA Historical Review Program as
“Sanitized” in 2003.
The reason I include this section in the Literature Review is to demonstrate that
much of what Americans knew in the mid-20th century about what was happening in
Guatemala, information which I present from scholars in my thesis, was not available at
the time it took place. Use of these materials on past history provide in-depth information and broaden understanding of U.S. foreign policy and conduct, covert operations,
and overall U.S. intervention in Guatemala.

40

CHAPTER THREE
Economic Considerations

Contextual Background: Guatemala, the United States and the World

In looking at historical events, Bowen acknowledges that both internal Guatemalan forces as well as external forces affected Guatemala in the late 19th century as
capitalism expanded in the world. One such external force (macro) was the state of the
world economy. Throughout the Industrial Revolution which was taking place in Europe
and the United States, wealth was concentrated in key sectors of the industrializing
economies (Jonas 1991, p 19). As the United States rose as a world power after its Civil
War, industrial capitalism flourished domestically within the country. A concentration of
wealth accrued which then prompted a search for expansion of opportunities overseas
where new markets could be established for export commodities. New international
markets also provided opportunities where profits might be invested. The industrial
economies also sought control of raw materials throughout the world (Jonas 1991, p 19).
As a result, U.S. capital and influence expanded simultaneously in the Caribbean and
Central America. This thesis will evaluate that U.S. influence on the country of
Guatemala.
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Paul Kennedy’s book deals with national and international power. He recognizes
that strong nations enhance or maintain their wealth and power through “interaction(s)
between economics and strategy” (Kennedy 1987, p xv). He says that there is “constant
interaction between strategy and economics” and that periods of both wartime and peace
must be examined in terms of economic and technological change (Kennedy 1987, p xxi).
In her Battle for Guatemala, Susanne Jonas asserts that a comprehensive analysis would
take into account the integration of Guatemala, a peripheral nation, into the capitalist
world system. She indicates that internal factors should be considered along with the
impacts of international factors, especially pressure from the United States (Jonas 1991,
p. 6). Jonas claims that U.S. intervention can be decisive at particular moments.
The armed uprising of revolutionary forces that drove the dictator Jorge Ubico y
Castañeda (1931-1944) from power in 1944 is identified as a particular decisive moment
by Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p. 299). The year of
the 1954 coup d’état is a decisive moment for Jonas (Jonas 1991, p. 6). Both of these
moments were significant in altering the course of Guatemala. In order to understand
impacts of the U.S. on Guatemala leading up to and during the 1954 coup, background
information is necessary to provide the context of what was yet to come. At the turn of
the 20th century U.S. capital investment was higher in Central America than any other
part of Latin America according to Edelberto Torres Rivas. For almost the next 30 years
more than 40 percent of U.S. direct investment in Central America went to Guatemala
(Torres Rivas 1993, p 48). Of primary importance are the events when leadership in
Guatemala allowed the U.S. based United Fruit Company (UFCO) into that country.
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The United Fruit Company came to prominence in Guatemala in the early 20th
century during the presidencies of Manuel José Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920) and General
Jorge Ubico y Castañeda (1931-1944). It was Estrada Cabrera who allowed the United
Fruit Company into Guatemala. Estrada Cabrera signed a contract with UFCO in 1904
which gave tax exemptions, land grants, and control of railroads to UFCO (Chapman
2007, p 56-57).
In the 1930s the Ubico regime further opened Guatemala’s economy to the foreign
capital of United Fruit Company. UFCO financed the construction of Guatemala’s
national railroad, International Railways of Central America, and the electric company,
Electric Bond and Share. As a result UFCO held controlling shares of capital stock in
these companies. Because of this, Guatemala’s national economic infrastructure—its
railroads, its telegraph and its electricity–all came to be held under private control. The
United Fruit Company opposed the building of highways which might compete with the
monopoly it held on the railroad lines. UFCO also had de facto control over Guatemala’s
Puerto Barrios.
This foreign investment capital brought with it preferential treatment. Jonas
writes that in addition to gaining control over a huge part of Guatemala’s most productive
land and resources it was also given preferential treatment in financial matters. There
were exemptions from paying taxes and also from paying duties on imports. Unlimited
profit remittances were allowed. Labor practices were not regulated (Jonas 1991, p 19).
These financial considerations meant that the Guatemalan government often deferred to
the interests of the United Fruit Company.
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Foreign investment capital also brought along with it political considerations. For
instance, President Ubico began his career working with the health board of the
Rockefeller Foundation (Immerman 1982, p 32). He had ties with the U.S. State
Department as early as 1919. Not surprisingly, President Ubico was the son of a Guatemalan lawyer and politician. He was well-connected and privileged. Ubico had studied
at prestigious institutions in Guatemala, as well as in the United States and Europe.
As a wealthy aristocrat, President Ubico protected the economic interests of Guatemalan elites, the urban bourgeoisie and owners of large tracts of land. Most notably
much of Guatemala’s arable agricultural land had been ceded to the United Fruit
Company. Because of this, foreign business interests often were in control of management and labor relations within Guatemala. Ubico supported foreign interests in labor
relations by protecting them from the complaints of the Guatemalan working class and
unions.
In her Terror in the Countryside: Campesino Responses to Political Violence in
Guatemala, 1954-1985, May explains:
“Guatemalan history is clear on this point: the elites of this country have historically oppressed the campesino majority, and they
have violently suppressed any attempts by the popular sectors to
organize or demand conditions that would allow them to live with
the barest essentials necessary to maintain basic human dignity”
(May 2001, p 14).

Not surprisingly then, Immerman comments that it was Ubico’s personal belief that
“general prosperity bred revolution” (Immerman 1982, p 34). Indeed, Ubico took action
to avoid revolution by opposing all forms of organized labor activity (Immerman 1982,
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p 34). An example of this includes Ubico’s disbanding of unions in the 1930s. The labor
movement continued its efforts to increase wages in spite of this.
President Ubico was head of Guatemala during the world depression in the global
market. The effects of the depression were felt primarily through Guatemala’s most
important crop–coffee. It was during the depression that coffee prices fell to less than
one-half of their previous value (Immerman 1982, p 31). After 1939 and throughout
World War II, Guatemala didn’t have access to European markets. Because of this, and
like other coffee producing countries in Latin America, Guatemala became dependent
upon the U.S. market (Immerman 1982, p 31). This resulted in an overall reduction in the
price of coffee and also decreased coffee exports, causing Guatemala to lose revenue.
Consequently unemployment rates also increased (Immerman 1982, p 32).
The majority population in Guatemala was indigenous, so naturally Indians made
up the majority of Guatemala’s labor force (Immerman 1982, p 35). During Ubico’s
leadership he practiced political, economic and social discrimination, especially toward
indigenous people. This could be seen in the system of vialidad and vagrancy laws.
These policies obligated each male Indian to pay a head tax which most could not afford
to pay (Immerman 1982, p 36). They were required to do wage work for at least 150 days
per year. The proof of whether or not they had done this work was marked in a libretto/government book. Indians were required to carry this libretto with them. If they could
not prove that they had met the work requirement then they would either be jailed or
forced to do unpaid labor such as road construction (Immerman 1982, p 36). This system
assured that the indigenous population would be forced to work in the capitalist exportoriented sector of the economy and that the state would have a cheap or even a free labor
45

force for its public works programs. This repression and suffering was not readily
accepted by the majority population. Many people came to see Ubico as a repressive
dictator.
In the existing authoritarian state, productive wealth was concentrated in the
hands of the minority. Control of productive sectors of the economy within Guatemala
was shared through alliances between the Guatemalan bourgeoisie and foreign interests.
Jonas also points out that the aforementioned railway and electric enterprises were
created and given concessions by the Guatemalan state. The largest landowner in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company, monopolized banana production (Jonas 1991, p 19).
Jonas writes that its subsidiary, International Railways of Central America, monopolized
transport facilities. Electric Bond and Share controlled Guatemala’s electrical facilities
(Jonas 1991, p 19). These three Guatemalan companies had unchallenged privilege until
the mid-1940s.
These monopolies operated as “states within a state” as described by Jonas (Jonas
1991, p 19). She asserts that they exerted political power over government policies. They
also had influence over the people who governed Guatemala. This system was maintained by close ties between the Guatemalan oligarchy and their related U.S. interests.
Jonas depicts this liberal model as a “strong” state which yielded control of national
resources, and production to private, primarily foreign interests (Jonas 1991, p 20). The
strong state’s functions were to protect private interests and to preserve law and order
(Jonas 1991, p 20). Essentially the Guatemalan state was there as protector and guarantor
of the existing system.
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The existence of this type of authoritarian state resulted in productive wealth
being concentrated in the hands of the minority. This was mostly due to those who
owned and controlled Guatemalan land. Prevost and Vanden note that large landed
estates in Latin America were remnants of colonial conquests–tracts of land originally
granted by Spanish monarchs. They were similar to the feudal landed estates which had
existed in the Iberian Peninsula (Prevost and Vanden 2011, p 10). Prevost and Vanden
posit that from colonial times to the present, those who held ownership to land reflected
the power configuration of the whole society (Prevost and Vanden 2011, p 10).
It was through this power configuration, Immerman writes, that perhaps the final
injustice came. The policies of Ubico’s Decree 2795 (Immerman 1982, p 37) granted
land owners the legal authority to actually shoot people who were hunting for food on
private land. These people were poor indigents who were mostly Indian. Such oppressive and unjust actions–forced labor, and allowing landlords to practice capital punishment, all in the interests of maintaining the status quo, were bound to result in problems
for the Ubico regime.
Problems could be seen for Ubico during the World War II years as Ubico lost
some support from Washington as Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer note in their
Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 26). Ubico did cooperate with the United States in enabling agents of the
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to oversee the confiscation of German-owned
properties. The agents also supervised the internment of German Guatemalans (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26-27). In spite of this, the Americans who were in charge did
not fully trust Ubico. According to these authors the U.S. military air base which was
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established near Guatemala City was there not only to oversee the Panama Canal, but
also to watch over Ubico (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 27).
It was during this time that the Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller
tried to get Latin American countries to obligate themselves with loans. The loans were
offered by the U.S. government and also by private banks. While borrowing this money
might have encouraged economic development in Guatemala, it would also have increased financial ties with the United States. Ubico was a fiscal conservative so he
refused these loans.
By the mid-1940s the Guatemalan economy had actually stabilized and substantial growth had taken place, as acknowledged in “Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Guatemala” from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. This
encouraged the emergence of an upwardly mobile middle class. Schlesinger and Kinzer
note that through the use of short wave radios Guatemalans were able to observe the
global warfare of World War II (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26). This communication
exposed Guatemalans to the promises of democracy. Guatemalans came to learn of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “four freedoms”, those being the freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Schlesinger and
Kinzer believe that hearing of these freedoms inspired Guatemalans. It made them aware
of the inequities in their own society. The ideas of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies awakened Guatemalans’ aspirations for a government which would dedicate itself to the public
good (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 26). Encouraged by FDR’s four freedoms many
Guatemalans demanded political change. They became determined to replace the Ubico
tyranny with democracy.
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The high point of revolution, as identified by Prevost and Vanden, was 1944 when
an armed uprising removed General Ubico from power (Vanden and Prevost 2011,
p 299). A rebel movement of students, workers and dissident army officers set up a
government through what was known as the October Revolution. It began with civil
unrest through protest of Ubico’s regime and was carried out by schoolteachers who
appealed for higher wages (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 27). Teachers and students
along with others began nonviolent demonstrations. Soon the middle and upper classes
joined them in protest, along with bureaucrats. This resulted in the largest protest Guatemala had ever experienced (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 27). Junior military
officers demanded that Ubico step down. The end of the Ubico regime in Guatemala
came through a coup d’état in 1944 which overthrew the thirteen year dictatorship. This
allowed for a national election in Guatemala.
The onset of this revolutionary era began with what is considered the first ever
democratically-elected leader in Guatemala. Through fair and open elections held in
December of 1944, a university professor, Juan José Arévalo Bermejo won wide support.
Arévalo took office in 1945. His goal was to move Guatemalan governance from the
previous military dictatorship toward a representative democracy.
In his inaugural address Arévalo promised to “give civic and legal value to all
people who live in this Republic” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990 p. 34, translated from El
Imparcial, March 16, 1945). He ended this address dedicating himself to the ideals of
FDR about whom he said “He taught us that there is no need to cancel the concept of
freedom in the democratic system in order to breathe into it a socialist spirit”. A reporter
who attended this inauguration interviewed the American diplomat Spruille Braden who
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was quoted as saying that the U.S. was “happy to see that Guatemala now occupies the
high place of one of the hemisphere’s democracies” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 34).

Agrarian Reform and Labor Protection

Arévalo set out four priorities: the consolidation of political democracy, agrarian
reform, protection of labor, and a better educational system (Schlesinger and Kinzer
1990, p 37). He created a new constitution with social and economic policies. He
divided powers amongst the executive, legislative and judicial branches (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 33). He encouraged the formation of political parties. Social guarantees
were made. These included freedom of speech and freedom of the press. A maximum
forty-hour work week with the assurance of one day off was instituted (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 34). Workers were able to unionize and to collectively bargain (Vanden
and Prevost 2011, p 299). Equal pay for men and women was required. Individual rights
were guaranteed. Equality was emphasized as husbands and wives were declared equal
before the law. Racial discrimination was made a crime (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990,
p 33). The Arévalo government prioritized spending on houses and schools and hospitals
(Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 299).
According to a U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian article, Arévalo
espoused a philosophy called “spiritual socialism”. This was a nationalistic philosophy
which stressed the “dignity of man”. In one of Arévalo’s speeches he articulated his
views:
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“We call this post-war socialism “spiritual” because in the world,
as now in Guatemala, there is a fundamental change in human values. The materialistic concept has become a tool in the hands of
totalitarian forces. Communism, fascism and Nazism have also
been socialistic. But that is a socialism which gives food with the
left hand while with the right it mutilates the moral and civic values of man” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p. 39-40).
Arévalo was widely supported as he believed that government could be vital in
improving the lives of the populace. He found communism distasteful, as can be understood from his statement “Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to
the psychology of man. …Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy …”
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 32).
Within Arévalo’s new leadership were provisions for moderate reform. One of
these was Article 92 which empowered the Guatemalan government to expropriate land
for the needs of society at large. Although Arévalo did not expropriate any land during
his tenure, this legislation alarmed the landed elites and caused them to begin to label him
a communist.
The U.S. State Department’s Office of Historian reports that U.S. perceptions of
Arévalo were favorable until he signed the 1947 Labor Code. This Labor Code was
modeled after the American National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) with its
provisions of guaranteed rights to organize trade unions, to engage in collective bargaining, and to strike if necessary (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 38-39). Ironically, despite
its usefulness for American Labor Relations, the Guatemalan Labor Code was a major
factor in the American intervention in Guatemala which was soon to come.
Like the American Labor Relations Act, the Guatemalan Code provided protection for Guatemalan labor. Urban workers had rights to organize unions. They could
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collectively bargain and strike. Minimum wages were established. Both women and
children workers were protected. These were revolutionary changes for peasants in
contrast to the previous libretto (government labor card) days of forced labor (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, p 39). The Labor Code caused concern for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the intelligence gathering agency for the United States at the time in
Guatemala and Latin America. Allegations were made that Arévalo was influenced by
communists because of his legalization of labor unions (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990,
p 40).
Most of the reform measures planned in the 1940s were only partially carried out,
as mentioned by the authors of Bitter Fruit (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 41). One
important result of the proposed planned reforms may have been that ordinary Guatemalans could see that the government had the ability to work for their needs (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, p 42). Immerman says that the October Revolution was a popular
victory which presented hopes for the advent of a new era. He holds that the overwhelming majority of Guatemalans saw this as their revolution, and looked forward to a new
government which would dedicate itself to developing programs in their interests
(Immerman 1982, p 42-43).
The next phase of the revolution resulted in the election of Jacobo Arbenz
Guzmán (1951-1954). He was the second democratically-elected President in the history
of Guatemala. Arbenz spoke of three objectives in his inaugural address (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951). The first was to move
Guatemala from being a “dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy to an economically independent country”. Second, he wanted to “convert Guatemala from a backward
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county with a predominantly feudal economy into a modern capitalist state”. Third, his
plans were directed to “raise the standard of living of the great mass of our people”
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951).
Arbenz directed that Guatemala’s economic policy should be based on strengthening private initiative and developing Guatemalan capital. He stated that “Foreign capital
will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains always subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperates with the economic development of the country, and
strictly abstains from intervening (emphasis mine) in the nation’s social and political life”
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52, from El Imparcial, March 16, 1951).
Arbenz was a nationalist who was determined to carry forward a number of
reforms. In his enthusiasm toward transforming Guatemala into a modern capitalist state
he strategized to limit the power of foreign companies by direct competition. To do this
he soon began the construction of a publicly-owned port to compete with UFCO’s Puerto
Barrios; a highway which would provide an alternative to the International Railways of
Central America railroad monopoly; and a hydroelectric plant which would be run by the
government and would provide electricity cheaper than the U.S. controlled Electric Bond
and Share monopoly (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 53). As important as these actions
were, it was just as significant what Arbenz did not do–he did not nationalize existing
businesses. This exemplifies that his plans were directed toward capitalistic development
through direct competition.
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Specifics of Land Reform

Arbenz’s political platform had advocated strongly for agrarian reform so it was
logical that he would begin to work hard for this important aspiration. Arbenz’s objective
was to redress the historically inequitable distribution of land. While some progress had
been made during Arévalo’s presidency, even so, the majority Guatemalan population
was still waiting for land reform. To put this in perspective, the 1950 Census indicated
that 2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of Guatemala’s arable land
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 50). Four million acres were owned by plantation owners
but less than one fourth of this land was actually being cultivated. This meant that the
large majority of available productive farmland was not put into production. This situation existed even while the majority population, that is 97.8 percent of the Guatemalan
people, did not have any land of their own. In acknowledging the magnitude of this land
tenure disparity it is not difficult to understand efforts to redistribute the land for the
benefit of the majority population of Guatemala.
Because 90 percent of the Guatemalan people lived in rural areas, Arévalo’s
reforms had brought little change for the majority of the population (Prevost and Vanden
2011, p 299). Arbenz’s goal was to extend Arévalo’s reforms to the rural areas. Conceivably, land reform would benefit the majority population of Guatemala, the landless
peasants and rural workers. It was Arbenz’s plan to address socioeconomic problems
through agrarian reform.
According to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian, the Communist Party in Guatemala (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) supported Arbenz’s ideas
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and participated in drafting legislation regarding land reform. In June of 1952 the Agrarian Reform Law passed which was also known as Decree 900 (Decreto Numero 900).
This Law mandated that large tracts of unused land were to be redistributed to peasants.
Previous owners of the expropriated land were to be compensated. Terms were drawn up
to compensate landowners with government bonds which would pay a three percent
return over a 25 year time period. The value of the compensation was based upon the land
value declared in the tax returns of the owners. Using this value raised major concern for
the previous land owners as they had likely undervalued their properties on their tax
returns. If that were the case, then it could be understood that this undervaluation of what
the land was actually worth, would have withheld large amounts of tax revenue from the
Guatemalan treasury, and for many years.
Decree 900 was a “model of orderliness”, says Stephen M. Streeter in Managing
the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961 (Streeter 2000,
p 19). He writes that laws were strictly followed and attempts were made to address
grievances. Specific details of this agrarian reform measure created a network of local
agrarian councils which administered the expropriation of unused land (Streeter 2000,
p 18). Farms under 224 acres in size were left intact. Farms between 224 and 672 acres
were exempted if two thirds of the land was under cultivation (Streeter 2000, p 18). Only
those estates larger than 672 acres were affected. It is significant to emphasize that
expropriations were planned for land which was not being cultivated.
People receiving expropriated land parcels had two choices. First they could
choose to privately own the land. Using this arrangement they would have to pay the
government 5 percent of their annual harvest over 25 years. The second alternative was
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that they could hold tenure over the land for their lifetime. For this they would pay just 3
percent over 25 years (Streeter 2000, p 18). This was the largest land reform in the
history of Guatemala.
Contrary to reform critic’s predictions, Streeter observes that the agricultural
production of corn, rice and cotton crops increased between 1952 and 1953 (Streeter
2000, p 19). It seems that agricultural production was not affected negatively from these
changes. Even Eisenhower officials recognized privately that Decree 900 was “a longoverdue measure of social and economic reform” (Streeter 2000, p 19).
In spite of these positive results U.S. government officials came to oppose the
reforms. Streeter explores why that might have been the case. One explanation was due
to personal and financial interests that existed between U.S. officials and the United Fruit
Company. The U.S. Secretary of State during the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency was
John Foster Dulles. Previous to this position Dulles had been a partner in the law firm of
Sullivan and Cromwell which specialized in international finance. This law firm had
drafted a 1936 contract which gave UFCO control of International Railways of Central
America and other privileges for 99 years (Streeter 2000, p 19).
Another attorney and Dulles brother, Allen, was also part of Eisenhower’s administration as he served as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. He had done legal work
for UFCO and also sat on its board of directors. These personal alliances between U.S.
officials and UFCO clearly posed the potential for conflicts of interest for the then current
U.S. administration cabinet members.
The effects of the Agrarian Reform Law–what many people considered modest
land reform policies–were a challenge to large land owners, most notably to UFCO.
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Even though the reforms were modest, this proved too much for the country’s oligarchy
and related U.S. powers.
The 1952 Land Reform Bill was a significant turning point for Guatemala as part
of the October Revolution, as seen by Schlesinger and Kinzer. They note Arbenz’s own
words:
“I do not exaggerate when I say that the most important pragmatic
point of my government and of the revolutionary movement of October is that one related to a profound change in the backward agricultural production of Guatemala, by way of an agrarian reform
which puts an end to the latifundios and the semi-feudal practices,
giving the land to thousands of peasants, raising their purchasing
power and creating a great internal market favorable to the development of domestic industry” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 54).

The revolutionary governments of Arévalo and Arbenz (1945-1954) with their
plans for political reform and land redistribution, demonstrate clearly a people’s movement, both figuratively and literally. This was not just philosophical political maneuvering. It was obvious that many Guatemalans’ lives were affected through their hopes and
expectations for democratic governance in Guatemala. The U.S. Department of State’s
Office of the Historian article notes that Guatemala’s majority population, the peasants,
were exuberant with prospects of the reforms.
Enacting land reform was also an actual geographical movement of people, as
more than a half million Guatemalans would have benefitted from the program out of a
total population of three million. About 1.4 million acres of land were redistributed to
these people in plots which averaged around 10 acres (Streeter 2000, p 19). These figures
demonstrate that almost one out of five Guatemalan citizens would be able to move to
their own land, a place of dignity and potential self-sufficiency. The reformist ideas of
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Presidents Arévalo and Arbenz held the possibilities for being a peoples’ movement in the
truest sense of the words.
This was the largest land reform in the history of Guatemala. This peoples’
movement was part of what authors Schlesinger and Kinzer say that Arbenz considered
as his greatest dream–land reform. Ironically, the authors add that the passage of the land
reform legislation also turned out to be “the fatal moment for Arbenz” (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 54).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Guatemala and the Cold War

Varying Perspectives on Communism

Having looked at the historical context of Guatemala including the time period
around the world depression and World War II, and having examined economic conditions within Guatemala during that time, we will now consider differing perspectives
relating to the influence of communism on Guatemalan national politics. Anticommunist rhetoric was an issue used to depose Guatemalan President Arbenz through
the 1954 coup.
For many Guatemalans the coup which removed President Arbenz brought to an
end what they considered “Ten Years of Spring” in the politics of their nation (Streeter
2000, p 13). May refers to the coup as the “overthrow of Guatemala’s revolution” (May
2001, p 8). In contrast, Schlesinger and Kinzer assess activity around the time of the
coup and note that the U.S. government referred to it as a “’Liberation’ movement”
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 13). These differing perspectives depend upon who
stood to gain, and what they stood to gain.
This chapter will include information on activities which the National Security
Archive recently declassified CIA documents (released on May 23, 1997) refer to as “the
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secret archives on the Guatemalan destabilization program” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997).
We will analyze U.S. manipulations of Cold War ideology and the role of the CIA in
planning U.S. sponsored covert Operations PBFORTUNE and later PBSUCCESS. These
operations ultimately resulted in the 1954 coup d’état and the removal of the freely
elected leader of Guatemala.
Both of the democratically-elected Presidents, Arévalo and Arbenz, worked for a
more participatory and egalitarian society. Popular support for their efforts could be seen
as “Between 1944 and 1954 … Popular organizations (including labor unions and
campesino organizations) thrived” (May 2001, p 4). For many Guatemalan social
sectors, their revolution was a time of democratization and a time of welcome reforms.
As a nationalist leader, President Arévalo espoused what he called “spiritual
socialism”. The U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian (U.S. Department of
State, Office of the Historian, Introduction) describes this philosophy as one which
promoted “freedom of spirit” as it stressed the “dignity of man”. Arévalo’s principles
emphasized human moral and civic values, while at the same time he criticized totalitarian forms of communism. The Historian’s Office records that U.S. perceptions of the
Arévalo presidency were initially positive. This changed in 1947 when Arévalo signed
the labor protection law. It was then that cables were sent from the American Embassy in
Guatemala City which charged that Arévalo allowed communists to organize. Even
though Arévalo got rid of both right-wing and left-wing extremists from government, he
was still labeled a communist. The Historian’s Office acknowledges that Arévalo was
even hesitant to work with communists.
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President Arbenz was clear about his goal to transform the Guatemalan oligarchic
society (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 49). This he would do through direct competition with foreign companies. His words communicated his intention to transform
Guatemala into a “modern capitalistic state” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 52 from El
Imparcial, March 16, 1951). Even so, he permitted communist participation. He met
with communists in 1951 to help draw up the Agrarian Reform Law/ Decree 900.
Because Decree 900 antagonized the landed gentry and the urban bourgeoisie, he too was
accused of supporting communism. There were contentions that Arbenz was influenced
by members of the Communist Party in Guatemala (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo)
who served in the Guatemalan Senate. President Arbenz continued similar work to that
of his predecessor, Arévalo. Both men used nationalistic efforts to challenge the status
quo and long-standing practices of economic feudalism. Although some of their reform
efforts were likened to those of Roosevelt’s New Deal, and patterned after U.S. labor law,
Guatemala’s political and economic governance became worrisome to factions in the
United States as well as to political and corporate interests in Guatemala. It was obvious
that the wealthy Guatemalan conservatives’ rights to private property would be affected.
The landed elite opposed the government’s policies. These minority groups began to
allege that communists had infiltrated their government.
Early on, U.S. government officials were not concerned with Guatemala as it
enacted its nationalist programs. The National Security Archive notes that the CIA
viewed Guatemala as a mere “Banana Republic” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). As the
proposed reforms moved forward, the U.S. State Department began to perceive
Guatemala’s behavior as a geopolitical threat since it might be used as an example for
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other countries in the area to follow. This can be understood from the following
quotation from the State Department’s Inter-American Bureau Officer, Charles Burrows:
“Guatemala has become an increasing threat to the stability of
Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a powerful propaganda weapon; its broad social program, of aiding the workers
and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and
large foreign enterprises, has a strong appeal to the populations of
Central American neighbors, where similar conditions prevail.”
(Gleijeses 1991, p 365)
Arbenz continued his reformist agenda and would not be deterred. He insisted on
Guatemala’s right to tend to its own political and business interests. Arbenz felt that
agrarian reform was necessary to improve the country’s economy and the lives of many
Guatemalan people. He made it known that foreign interests would be subject to the laws
of Guatemala. There would be no exceptions made for UFCO.
The State Department’s Office of the Historian describes the skewed distribution
of resources in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During that time, two percent of the
population controlled more than 72 percent of Guatemala’s arable land. Since
Guatemala’s economy was largely dependent upon agriculture, poverty and malnutrition
were widespread in the country. Less than 12 percent of the privately-held land was
actually being cultivated. As a private owner of land, the United Fruit Company was
most definitely affected by Arbenz’s land reform. In both March and October of 1953,
and again in February of 1954, the Arbenz government expropriated portions of UFCO’s
unused farmlands. As a consequence of Decree 900 more than half of UFCO’s 550,000
acres of banana land on both the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts was expropriated
(Streeter 2000, p 20).
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The Guatemalan government decided that fair compensation for the expropriated
land would be the value which United Fruit Company itself had declared on its tax
returns. UFCO’s returns indicated the value of the land to be $1.85 million. The
Guatemalan government offered this amount in compensation to UFCO for its land. As
the expropriation was enacted UFCO took exception and contested that this value was too
low. UFCO asserted that the true value of the property was actually $19.35 million
(Streeter 2000, p 20).
The May 3, 1954 Time magazine article entitled “Square Deal Wanted” reported
that “communists and agrarian reformers who run Guatemala’s government grabbed . . .
UFCO’s best banana reserve (emphasis mine) lands”. UFCO then asked the U.S. Government for help. This Time article stated that the United States formally billed
Guatemala for UFCO’s full claim. This was the “biggest claim presented to any foreign
government on behalf of a private U.S. firm since the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938”
(Square Deal Wanted, May 3, 1954). Secretary of State Cordell Hull insisted that sovereign governments do have the right to expropriate property, but that amongst other
conditions, payment must be “adequate”. The Time article stated that the U.S. government served notice that “the matter had become one for the two governments to handle”.
The U.S. Government was acting “for U.S. citizens” in negotiations to arrive at a “square
deal”. The Arbenz government of the sovereign nation of Guatemala rejected this higher
valuation of the land.
As workers emphasized their rights they began to challenge the exploitative
practices of Guatemalan business interests, like the United Fruit Company. Because
UFCO held huge tracts of land it also employed a large part of the Guatemalan work
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force. It recognized that it would be affected by the reforms and perhaps moreso than any
other land holder.
It was not long until allegations began which contended that President Arbenz was
a communist. In the time period of McCarthyism with its exaggerated views on communism, it became convenient to apply what was then referred to as the “duck test”.
Immerman recounts what Ambassador Richard Patterson explained to a 1950 Rotary
Club audience (Immerman 1982, p 102). Patterson asserted that if an unidentified bird
looked like a duck, walked, swam and quacked like a duck, that it could be considered a
duck, even if the bird wasn’t wearing a label which indicated that it was a duck. This
analogy was then applied to President Arbenz in 1954. United States Ambassador John
E. Peurifoy told the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that if Arbenz
talked, thought or acted like a communist, even if he was not a communist, then he “will
certainly do until one comes along” (Streeter 2000, p 21). The Department of State’s
Historian’s Office relates that the rationale used to try to justify that he was a communist
is that if Arbenz tolerated known communists, then that would make him a “fellow
traveler” with them, or possibly a communist himself. During the Cold War era this was
a serious charge.
In the context of the Cold War it was not difficult for the United States to inject
geopolitical considerations into the reformist choices the Guatemalan Government was
making. Guatemalan land reform programs were soon asserted to be communist intrusions from the USSR. U.S. intelligence agencies expressed concern that Soviet economic
and political ideologies were infiltrating into what the United States considered to be its
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own back yard–Latin America. CIA Director Allen Dulles alleged that Guatemala could
become a communist beachhead in the Americas.
The expropriation of land through Decree 900 turned out to be an opportunity to
combine economic and political interests, as presented by CIA Director Allen Dulles, to
his brother John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State. Land expropriation was now
being used in anti-communist propaganda against the Guatemalan Government. A
disinformation campaign pushed President Eisenhower toward getting the U.S. Government involved in the private business dealings of UFCO.
The United Fruit Company had asked both the Harry Truman and Dwight D.
Eisenhower administrations to act against Decree 900. In 1953 the Boston-based UFCO
had actually requested that the Eisenhower Administration confront Guatemala’s
Government in order to reverse the Decree. President Eisenhower was reluctant to get
involved at first. To counter this, UFCO hired the advertiser Edward R. Bernays, who is
regarded as the father of public relations. Regarding Bernays’ campaign, a Harvard
article puts forth that “right messages can even spark revolution” (Buday 2000, p 10). It
goes on to say that “Bernays worked the press and skillfully exploited America’s fear of
communism”. They claim that, partly because of Bernays’ efforts, the Guatemalan leftist
regime was overthrown (Buday 2000, p 10). Bernays’ multi-media campaign to spread
disinformation alleging that the Arbenz government was actually communist did in fact
change American public opinion and also the President’s stance. Eisenhower did not
want to appear to be soft on communism, so the successful results of this campaign
caused him to get involved in this issue.
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For critics of Decree 900 and people in Washington who sought such a rationale,
these assertions provided them with what they needed. They alleged that communism
had been established in the Americas, specifically in Guatemala. Jonas contends that it
was the role of United States which made the situation in Guatemala into a “Cold War
civil war” which could provoke an East-West confrontation (Jonas 2000, p. 119). The
State Department Historian’s Office reports that critics concluded that the problem in
Guatemala was not agrarian reform–rather the problem was communism.

Preparation for Ouster of Arbenz through a Coup d’état

In looking at possible explanations for U.S. intervention in efforts to destabilize
the Guatemalan government through removal of a democratically-elected leader, we must
consider the timing of possible explanations to determine their plausibility. The basis for
intervention put forward by the U.S. government was that agrarian reform was an indicator of Soviet style ideology, and this brought with it the potential of communist infiltration into the Western Hemisphere. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of
the Historian, the CIA drew up contingency plans to remove Arbenz from office as early
as 1951. The Historian’s Office acknowledgement is remarkable as it is clear that the
covert 1951 plans were made well before the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 was even
written.
The Historian’s Office recounts that the 1951 plans were drawn up by the CIA
under orders from the U.S. State Department under the name Operation PBFORTUNE.
The National Security Archive indicates that PBFORTUNE was actually authorized by
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President Truman in 1952 (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). Accordingly, the PBFORTUNE
plot began in September of 1952 with plans to supply counter-revolutionary rebel groups
with funds and matériel to depose Arbenz if he was deemed to be a communist.
Early allegations of communism can be seen in February 1952 planning memos
for PBFORTUNE from CIA Headquarters (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). One such manual
contains the title “Guatemalan Communist (emphasis mine) Personnel to be disposed of
during Military Operations” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 4). Categories were
established through which some people would be “neutralized”, others imprisoned or yet
others exiled from Guatemala. In time, the CIA secret plans for PBFORTUNE were
discovered and so this operation was terminated in October of 1952.
In assessing the declassified CIA secret documents, the National Security Archive
notes that Operation PBFORTUNE was the precursor to Operation PBSUCCESS. Both
were covert operations to oust Arbenz, however Operation PBSUCCESS actually
achieved this goal. Documents from the CIA’s Operation PBSUCCESS were released in
1997. According to these documents this effort was authorized by President Eisenhower
in 1953 (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997).
As part of the National Security Archive, one narrative history of the 1954 coup
was provided by a diplomatic historian named Nicholas Cullather (Doyle and Kornbluh
1997, Document 5). He worked for one year on a contract with the CIA where he
accessed CIA secret documents in order to produce an overview called “Operation
PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954”. What Cullather discovered was a “surprisingly critical study of the agency’s first covert operation in Latin
America” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). He described this operation as an
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intimate account of what rationale was used to convince President Eisenhower to authorize the ousting and forceful removal of the democratically-elected President of a sovereign country, that is, President Arbenz.
The National Security Archive denotes that Operation PBSUCCESS had a budget
of $2.7 million. It was planned as “psychological warfare and political action” and
“subversion” which were to be carried out in a paramilitary war (Doyle and Kornbluh
1997). The Archive documents reveal from the CIA’s “K program” that “the option of
assassination” of President Arbenz was considered, even up until his resignation on June
27, 1954. Cullather documents information regarding a CIA narrative history of details
of organizing and executing a planned coup through Operation PBSUCCESS (Doyle and
Kornbluh 1997, Document 5).
In June of 1995 in a search of the National Security Archive’s materials about
Guatemala, CIA staff historian, Gerald Haines, wrote a brief history on the “CIA and
Guatemalan Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document
1). One conclusion reached from his historical report indicates that as early as January of
1952 lists were compiled by CIA headquarters of names of individuals who would be
“eliminate(d) immediately in event of [a] successful anti-Communist (emphasis mine)
coup” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 1). CIA planning for assassinations included budgeting, armaments transfers, training programs, creation of lists of people to target
and also hit teams.
The training files of Operation PBSUCCESS revealed an unsigned, undated howto guide book on political killing, entitled “A Study of Assassination” (Doyle and
Kornbluh 1997, Document 2). It details procedures and instruments to be used to carry
68

out assassinations. The guide advises “The simplest local tools are often the most
efficient means of assassination”. It instructs further that it would be sufficient to use
“anything hard, heavy and handy” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 2). Trainees
are cautioned in the use of body cavity puncture wounds and told that “Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region”. The guide book
explains that plausible deniability is provided if assassination instructions are not written
or recorded. It states outright that murder “is not morally justifiable” but then goes on to
advise that “persons who are morally squeamish should not attempt it” (Doyle and
Kornbluh 1997, Document 2).
A National Security Archive declassified document dated March 31, 1954 which
was used in planning for Operation PBSUCCESS contains one of many assassination
lists. This particular list is a request from a CIA division chief asking to obtain the
names of Arbenz government leaders, communist party members, and persons “of tactical
importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action (emphasis mine)” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997,
Document 3).
Now convinced that Guatemalan leadership had ties to communism, interested
parties in the United States proceeded with the paramilitary invasion named Operation
PBSUCCESS. A “liberation army” (el ejército de liberación) was recruited, trained and
armed by the United States’ CIA. This paramilitary effort was led by a man named
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas who was handpicked by the CIA. He was a graduate of
U.S. military training in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Jonas 1991, p 29). The mercenary
soldiers used in this operation were Guatemalan exiles who were trained outside of
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Guatemala. What began with a CIA campaign to misrepresent, then depose President
Arbenz, now became a military action.
Was Arbenz a genuine threat to the United States? In Bitter Fruit, an account of
“The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala”, Schlesinger and Kinzer ask if
instead he was more a threat to the principal U.S. monopoly, the United Fruit Company
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xiii). In her Battle for Guatemala Jonas encapsulates the
history of this time period by writing “the overthrow of Arbenz is one of the clearest
examples in modern history of U.S. policy being affected by direct ties of public officials
to private interests” (Jonas 1991, p 32). She charges that the history of the United Fruit
Company clearly demonstrates U.S. complicity in the state affairs of a sovereign country.
Jonas concludes that diplomatic, economic and military actions on the part of the
United States resulted in the 1954 coup d’état, and consequently the Guatemalan civil
war (1960-1996). Her scholarly work details U.S. participation and guidance which
portrayed ideological and political overtones of a “Cold War civil war” (Jonas 2000,
p 17). U.S. intervention in Guatemala helped to set in motion what Jonas describes as the
longest and bloodiest civil war in the hemisphere (up until that time).
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CHAPTER FIVE
1954 Coup d’état

Guatemala Is “Liberated”: Operation PBSUCCESS

In the previous chapters we highlighted economic interests and anti-communist
assertions. Streeter’s analysis combines these emphases. He contends that the Eisenhower administration’s policy toward Guatemala regarded communism as the primary
concern, while the changing conditions for UFCO were the “subsidiary” issue (Streeter
2000, p 20). An analogy used by Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1947) for perceived
communism was that Guatemala was considered as a rotten apple in a barrel that could
infect other apples around it (Streeter 2000, p 23). The conditions in Guatemala had to be
changed in case other surrounding countries also decided that they could defy the United
States. Streeter puts forth the argument that the Eisenhower administration wanted to
maintain U.S. hegemony in Guatemala and by extension to “prevent other Latin American countries from straying from the U.S. orbit” (Streeter 2000, p 23). This could be
attempted through military intervention.
It is not the aim of this thesis to chronicle every activity leading up to and during
the 1954 coup d’état. The purpose is to point out how the United States influenced
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Guatemala during this time period, and to highlight specific activity and intervention
efforts by the United States which may have affected the internal workings of Guatemala.
Activity surrounding the coup can be best understood through steps taken toward
“reliance upon Third World official military institutions as guarantors of U.S. foreign
policy objectives” argues Bowen in “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Radical Change:
Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954” (Bowen 1983, p 89). Bowen uses declassified documents in researching the “Guatemalan affair” in the context of international
relations in the Western Hemisphere. He believes that interests in both Guatemala and the
United States were in jeopardy, so they “acted symbiotically, if not jointly” in the 1954
coup in Guatemala (Bowen 1983, p 89). Because the United States was the preeminent
military power in the region, it followed that the Eisenhower administration used its
control there. In the case of Guatemala, it was decided that U.S. foreign policy objectives
would not be served by controlling the existing military institutions there, but rather they
could be “liberated” and then the existing military could be replaced.
One strategy to keep Guatemala in check was through an arms embargo which the
United States had put in place during the Arévalo administration (Bowen 1983, p 92).
The United States had refused to sell arms to Guatemala since 1948 (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 148) even while it continued to sell weapons and airplanes to Guatemala’s
neighboring countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras (Bowen 1983, p 92-93). Not only
did the United States not sell arms to Guatemala but it also blocked arms purchases by
the Guatemalan Government from other countries. The Guatemalan Government recognized its diminishing military strength compared to its neighboring countries. It also
recognized from its intelligence gathering that there were indications of an impending
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paramilitary invasion by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p
149).
In its recognition of the need to reinforce its own armed forces, in the spring of
1954 the Guatemalan Government bought munitions from Czechoslovakia. The United
States tried to halt that shipment of arms but was unable to do so. The munitions were
delivered to Puerto Barrios by the Swedish ship Alfhem on May 15, 1954 (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, p 147-148). This weapons shipment consisted of small arms, ammunition, and light artillery pieces from the Skoda arms factory (Eisenhower 1963, p 421426). Because Czechoslovakia was a satellite country of the Soviet Union, this event
turned out to be an opportunity for the CIA to insinuate to the American press and thus to
the American public that the arms purchase was evidence of communist subversion in
Guatemala.
The CIA’s reaction to news of the shipment was “one of relief” in Schlesinger and
Kinzer’s view. They posit that the agency had been looking for a credible pretext to
justify a plan which involved Castillo Armas (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 150). The
CIA then used this shipment to go forward with their Operation PBSUCCESS. As
quickly as the day after the delivery of the arms shipment, on May 16, CIA Director Allen
Dulles met with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following day Dulles met with the
National Security Council and convinced Eisenhower’s strategists to aid Castillo Armas
and his fellow mercenaries. The date for the invasion was then set for the following
month (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 151).
Bowen claims that a regional campaign was orchestrated by the United States.
Fellow Central American countries El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and
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Panama were part of a propaganda campaign and also part of active efforts directed
against the policies of both the Arévalo and Arbenz governments. These Central American countries held discussions amongst themselves while excluding Guatemala. Bowen
writes that when Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala, the Salvadoran head of state, Major
Oscar Osorio, not only had prior knowledge of this event, but had advised CIA operatives
that he had 2,500 soldiers on reserve to assist in case they were needed (Bowen 1983,
p 93-94). In other Central American cooperation, Castillo Armas’ expatriate army trained
in Nicaragua in 1953-1954. Interestingly enough, it trained on the Anastasio Somoza
family estate. It was from Nicaragua that Castillo Armas based his air support during the
attack on Guatemala. Financial support was also provided by both Somoza and the
dictatorial leader of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo (Bowen 1983, p 94).
Arbenz’s adversaries were also living in and communicating with Castillo Armas
from Honduras. Bowen posits that hostility of the Honduran government toward Arbenz
was maintained by the United States. This can be understood from the following statement from the 1954 American Ambassador to Honduras, Whiting Willauer:
“I certainly was called upon to perform very important duties particularly to keep the Honduran government–which was scared to
death about the possibilities of themselves being overthrown–keep
them in line so they would allow this revolutionary activity to continue, based in Honduras” (U.S. Senate, June 5, 1961, p 866).
Ambassador Willauer recognized the fear in the Honduran government. Bowen notes
that hostility was maintained in order to carry out what the United States had planned.
This is much like the continuing campaign which existed to manipulate the ideas of the
American public toward Guatemala with the fear of a communist menace. As part of this
campaign, the CIA and UFCO’s press officers tried to direct public opinion through
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restricted coverage in the American press. Bowen points out that CIA Director Allen
Dulles spoke to the New York Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger and asked him to
keep reporter Sydney Gruson away from Guatemala. Gruson was stationed in Mexico
City but reported on Guatemalan issues. Allen Dulles shared concerns with the Times
publisher that both he, and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, did not
believe that Gruson was inclined to reporting “objectively” on the Guatemalan situation
(Bowen 1983, p 95). Two examples of Gruson’s reporting follow.
Gruson’s May 22, 1954 New York Times article was entitled “Guatemala Says
U.S. Tried to Make Her Defenseless”. This article commented on the United States’ ban
on arms shipments to Guatemala, and Guatemala’s desire to buy arms for the purposes of
its own defense, or to repel a potential invasion. In this article Guatemalan Foreign
Minister Guillermo Toriello was quoted as saying: “For us, Communist-controlled
territory is the Soviet Union. Other countries are sovereign.” He later added “Guatemala
is not a colony of the United States nor an associated state that requires permission of the
United States Government to acquire the things indispensable for its defense and security,
and it repudiates the pretentions of this Government [the United States] to supervise the
legitimate acts of a sovereign government” (Gruson, May 22, 1954, New York Times).
In this same May 22, 1954 Times article, Gruson reported on Guatemalan reaction
to the United States and UFCO’s demand for the higher dollar value in compensation for
UFCO’s land expropriation. Foreign Minister Toriello was quoted as saying that he
deemed the demand for the higher value to be “open intervention (emphasis mine)” in
Guatemala.
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In another Gruson news story reported after the Alfhem ship delivery, as noted by
authors of Bitter Fruit, Gruson observed that Guatemalans and other Latin Americans
reacted with support toward Arbenz in light of the American attacks (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p 154). In the news story, Gruson wrote “The reaction has served to remind
observers that the dominant feeling among articulate Guatemalans is not pro- or anticommunist or pro- or anti-Yankeeism but fervent nationalism” (Gruson, New York Times,
May 24, 1954). News content of this type was counter to what the CIA desired. Schlesinger and Kinzer report that Gruson was about to investigate the Castillo Armas invasion
of Guatemala but was restricted in his efforts until after the coup d’état had already taken
place (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 155).
The CIA also went as far as to enlist the aid of American Catholic hierarchy in its
plans to affect people’s thinking. The CIA asked New York’s Cardinal Francis Spellman
to clandestinely contact Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano. As a result of
this request a pastoral letter was written and then read to Guatemalan churches on April 9,
1954. The letter asked “the people of Guatemala . . . [to] rise as a single man against this
enemy of God and country” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 155). The CIA also arranged
for thousands of leaflets with this same message to be airdropped in remote areas of
Guatemala.
It is noteworthy that during Operation PBSUCCESS much of the Guatemalan
populace did not know of many of the events which were taking place in their own
country. This is because the CIA was controlling significant modes of communication in
Guatemala. The agency launched a clandestine radio campaign about seven weeks before
the invasion (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 167). The goal of the campaign was to
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spread fear and panic throughout Guatemala via a radio station called Radio Liberation/Voice of Liberation (Voz de la liberacion). In May and June of 1954, pro-Castillo
Armas messages were transmitted through CIA radio transmitters. Broadcasters and
technicians in this effort had been trained by the CIA. This station presented itself as if it
were being broadcast from the jungle in Guatemala; in actuality it had connections in
Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and even the U.S. State of Florida.
In order to urge people to join the Castillo Armas Liberation movement this
station represented itself as the voice of Guatemalan patriots who were opposed to the
Arbenz government (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 168). The broadcast presented
information about nonexistent things such as civilian uprisings and military defections.
When the official Guatemalan station tried to truthfully deal with these erroneous rumors,
Radio Liberation used jamming equipment which was located in the U.S. embassy to
block reception of the government station. It imitated the music and bells of the official
Guatemalan station and presented its own broadcast as if it were the official government
station’s broadcast.
Immerman focuses on a CIA memorandum to Eisenhower that U.S. efforts alone
looked doubtful and would not be enough (Immerman 1982, p 161). The CIA’s acting
assistant director for current intelligence explained to President Eisenhower that the
“controlling factor” was the loyalty of the regular Guatemalan army officers (Immerman
1982, p 161). They felt that if the regular Guatemalan forces chose to fight, then without
much difficulty, they could resist the invasion. Castillo Armas did not have enough
military power himself to oust Arbenz. The CIA communicated that the entire effort
would depend upon psychological impact rather than military strength.
77

Using the radio they could create the impression that there were rebels everywhere in Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 169). Using airplanes they even
parachuted dummies into rural areas to give the impression to Guatemalan peasants that
rebels were near. It was the job of the Castillo Armas effort to “create and maintain for a
short time the impression of very substantial military strength” (Immerman 1982, p 161).
This was a “psychological war”–a “war of nerves” (Immerman 1982, 162-163). One use
of the radio was to raise the anxiety of and to frighten the Guatemalan people. These
efforts were also directed at undermining the confidence of the Guatemalan military by
splitting them from their loyalty to Arbenz (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 168). In the
end it was designed to cause President Arbenz to abandon his post and to resign.
As we highlight efforts made by the United States, we see that Bowen objectively
takes note of the changing situation in Guatemala. He says that the time period when the
reforms were taking place was not trouble free. In his assessment of the internal security
of Guatemala during 1953 and 1954, he acknowledges that violence was actually taking
place. Some disunity and division were present within the Guatemalan armed forces.
Bowen believes that U.S. analysts perceived doubt in the Guatemalan military corps. The
analysts questioned whether or not the Arbenz administration could maintain the place
that military had held in Guatemalan society. United States analysts believed that this
doubt could be exploited and perhaps be used to enact a coup d’état.
One key person who kept himself informed of the changes in Guatemala was
American Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy. Bowen asserts that Peurifoy developed contacts within Guatemala who could advise of internal vulnerabilities. He wanted
to be sure that the United States could use these adversaries and their information for the
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benefit of U.S. planning. Contacts were developed over time and Bowen says that by
January of 1954 officers regularly reported to CIA officials (Bowen 1983, p 92).
Through related planning they projected that in four or five months there would be a
change in Guatemalan leadership.
Bowen writes that by June 15 the CIA was reporting to the Eisenhower administration that top Guatemalan army officers were in contact and discussing plans for
Arbenz’s overthrow (Bowen 1983, p 95). A final meeting on Operation PBSUCCESS
was held with Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff all in attendance (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 170). Operation PBSUCCESS was approved on June 15, 1954. The plan was for Castillo Armas to
invade Guatemala to provoke a coup which would result in the overthrow of Arbenz.
The continuing covert nature of this well-planned coup can be understood from a
June 18, 1954 excerpt from the Diary of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to President
Eisenhower. The Press Secretary’s diary entry states: “Allen Dulles called early in the
morning to tell me that his organization expected there would be an anti-Communist
uprising in Guatemala very shortly. Officially we don’t know anything about it. The
story broke late Friday night” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, June 18, 1954).
This operation was designed very much in advance, as can be understood from a
secret memorandum released as sanitized by the CIA’s Historical Review Program in
2003. This Memo was addressed to “Chief, WH [White House]”. The Subject line
indicates “Declaration of Col. Castillo Armas”. The one sentence message states
“Attached is a translation of a proposed ‘declaration’ by Col. Castillo Armas.” The date
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of the Memorandum was February 1, 1954–which is more than four months before the
June 1954 coup (CIA “Declaration of Col. Castillo Armas” Memorandum, February 1,
1954). Any pretense from the previous paragraph’s diary entry of Press Secretary Hagerty
to the President, which claims it had no official knowledge about the imminent “uprising”
does not seem to be factual.
As far as specific events surrounding the coup, we have already seen that the CIA
used Radio Liberation and aerial drops of literature to carry out a propaganda campaign.
The United States had also handpicked Castillo Armas as the man who would lead the
anti-Arbenz operation. Castillo Armas was a right-wing Guatemalan army officer who
had been exiled from Guatemala. On June 13 Castillo Armas went to Tegucigalpa,
Honduras to meet with his troops. This was the first time the troops had ever met with
their commander. The CIA had transported around 170 soldiers to Honduras (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, p 170). Like Castillo Armas these were mercenary soldiers. They were
Guatemalan exiles, and/or a mixed number of Central Americans, and/or American
soldiers of fortune, who had been trained by the CIA in Nicaragua. Forty-eight hours
before the invasion, the troops were sent to small border villages in Honduras, where the
CIA provided them with bazookas, machine guns, grenade launchers and rations
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 171).
The day before the invasion, more Liberation troops were delivered to Honduran
border towns via CIA-chartered DC-3 planes. On June 18 Colonel Castillo Armas crossed
into Guatemala in his command car which was followed by several vehicles. Since no
spontaneous revolt took place they were told to stay put (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990,
171). On the morning of the invasion the CIA sent a pilot to drop leaflets over Guatemala
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City. Other pilots were sent by the CIA to provide aerial harassment and to intimidate
Arbenz into submission. In one case a grenade and a dynamite stick were dropped from a
plane onto fuel tanks which caused an explosion and intimidating noises at the port
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 172).
Between June 17 and June 27, 1954 the CIA directed the impression of warfare
toward the Guatemalan people. Panic resulted from their propaganda in efforts to support
Castillo Armas, Bowen recounts (Bowen 1983, p 96). These carefully used tactics can be
understood from the following memo from the CIA to President Eisenhower on June 20,
1954:
“… it will be seen how important are the aspects of deception and
timing. . . in arousing other latent forces of resistance [to Arbenz]. .
. the entire [Castillo] effort is thus more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength, although it is
upon the ability of the Castillo Armas effort to create and maintain
for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength
that the success of this particular effort primarily depends. The use
of a small number of airplanes and the massive use of radio broadcasting are designed to build up and give main support to the impression of Castillo Armas’ strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime’s weakness” (Bowen 1983, p 96).
From the previous quotation Bowen emphasizes the “latent forces of resistance” which he
identifies as the Guatemalan military officers who were part of the official Guatemalan
armed forces. He explains that these officers were the primary object of U.S. anti-Arbenz
policy. According to Bowen, the United States was displeased about the role of communists in the social mobilization which was taking place in the country. He contends
however that the goal of American policy was “not a popular conquest leading to an
anticommunist revolution” but instead “American policy sought to foment a military
coup” (Bowen 1983, p 96). And indeed it did.
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On June 18, 1954 Castillo Armas’ army of liberation invaded Guatemala from
several border points. The use of several points was to give the impression that
Guatemala was being invaded by a large force. Much deception was used to advance this
small band of mercenaries. Psychological warfare continued and was meant to provoke
panic among the people. The Voice of Liberation broadcast gave the impression that
Castillo Armas and his men were being welcomed.
The invasion did not go as planned. The Guatemalan Army was able to turn back
efforts by Castillo Armas to seize several towns (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 171).
Heavy equipment slowed them down. The Guatemalan Army defeated mercenaries at
some locations, and mercenaries were killed and captured. Botched and unsuccessful
attacks resulted in several requests through Allen Dulles to send airplanes (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, p 177). The planes were finally provided. Over the next few days with
the use of these planes and the overall well-organized psychological warfare, this ultimately resulted in the intimidation and demoralization of the Arbenz forces (Schlesinger
and Kinzer 1990, 192). Although the threat from the mercenaries was not significant,
Castillo Armas and his liberation army were able to advance into Guatemala.
Specific actions related to the coup d’état took place between June 17 to June 27,
1954. As President Arbenz saw his support base dwindle, he addressed the country by
government radio and resigned on June 27 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 199-201,
from El Imparcial July 28, 1954). This ended the October Revolution or the Ten Years of
Spring (1944-1954).
Bowen concludes that “the U.S. role was the very essence of Castillo Armas’ part
of the ‘liberation’” (Bowen1983, p 96). This chapter depicts U.S. assistance in the
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overthrow of (what some people refer to as) the “liberation” of the Guatemalan Government in 1954. Castillo Armas took power in Guatemala that same year. The United
States then established diplomatic relations with the new “anti-Communist” Guatemalan
Government on July 13, 1954 (Waggoner July 14, 1954 New York Times).

Results of the 1954 Coup

As stated at the outset of the preceding chapter, the Revolution for many hopeful
and expectant Guatemalans was replaced with a new regime. Schlesinger and Kinzer
carefully document that “the United States government was in fact the secret creator and
sponsor of the ‘liberation’ movement” (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p 13). “Liberation”
is commonly understood as the securing of equal social and economic rights for a particular group. In looking at this understanding of the concept of liberation, it can be questioned as to which particular group or groups gained rights, or social or economic opportunities as a consequence of either Operation PBFORTUNE or PBSUCESS, or the 1954
coup.
As for the overall effects on the country of Guatemala, as a result of President
Eisenhower getting the United States involved, the U.S. State Department reduced aid to
Guatemala. It also limited trade with Guatemala. This was particularly significant
because the United States was Guatemala’s largest trading partner. Streeter notes that by
the early 1950s, around 70 percent of Guatemala’s exports went to the United States, and
around 64 percent of Guatemala’s imports were from the United States (Streeter 2000,
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p 191). The disinformation campaign and resultant actions by the United States had a
huge negative impact on the Guatemalan national economy.
After World War II, economic options in Latin America were very limited, as
Vanden and Prevost write. This was due to the overall power of the United States and
also U.S. perceptions during the Cold War (Vanden and Prevost 2011, p 327-328). The
authors observe that it was difficult to find an alternative path for economic and political
development. Prevost and Vanden take the position that Guatemala was the most dramatic example of the price paid by Latin Americans in their pursuit of a path which was
unsupported by the United States.
What effect did this so called liberation have on the Guatemalan people? As a
result of U.S. sponsored intervention, Guatemala was “liberated” from its democraticallyelected President. As a result of U.S. intervention, the Constitutional laws of Guatemala’s land reform ceased from being enacted. Land reform was to have redistributed an
average of 10 acres each to almost one out of every five people. This change in Guatemala’s leadership and the cessation of planned land reform resulted in the deterioration of
hope and exuberance of the majority campesino and rural labor population.
Bowen reaches several conclusions relative to U.S. covert operations in Guatemala from 1950-1954. He writes that U.S. policy was overseen at the highest levels of
American Government, that being the Eisenhower Presidency and his administration.
United States diplomatic personnel worked in concert toward the enactment of clandestine operations (Bowen 1983, p 98). In hearings before the U.S. Senate in 1961, U.S.
Ambassador to Honduras Whiting Willauer proudly boasts of the part that he played in
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Guatemala, from his post in Honduras. Willauer testifies that Allen Dulles himself sent
Willauer a telegram after the fact in which he stated that “the revolution could not have
succeeded but for what I did” (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866).
Bowen recognizes the impact of political institutions and socioeconomic priorities
on national self-determination. He states that the paramount political lesson learned by
the United States in the Guatemalan Affair was the reliance “on local militaries to serve
as junior partners with U.S. covert operatives in the protection of U.S. interests” (Bowen
1983, p 99).
Following the Guatemalan Affair, Bowen posits, the U.S. Government’s primary
objective was “the cultivation of pro-American attitudes in and actions by official military hierarchies” (Bowen 1983, p 99). In the chapter which follows we will discuss U.S.
influence as it pursued that stated objective in the developing military hierarchies of the
Guatemalan State.
.
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CHAPTER SIX
Militarization: Legacy of “Liberation”

Castillo Armas Secures His Power

In terms of successful CIA clandestine military operations during this time period,
Guatemala was one of two countries about which the CIA boasted (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, p xii). (The other country was Iran.) As noted previously, the goal of
Operation PBSUCCESS was to remove President Arbenz from power and to replace his
government with one headed by Castillo Armas. We have seen that Arbenz did indeed
resign. As a result of the 1954 coup both he and his top aides fled from Guatemala
(Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). The United States established relations with the new government of Castillo Armas. As we will see, the coup was just the beginning of the
militarization of Guatemala, which continued through a several decades-long civil war.
Castillo Armas proceeded to replace local administrators and magistrates with his
own people. He repealed the 1945 constitution. In its place he issued a “political statute”
which gave him all executive and legislative functions (Immerman 1982, p 199). The
political changes he made were authoritarian in nature, as it wasn’t until two years later,
in 1956, that Castillo Armas actually instituted a new constitution. Castillo Armas
attempted to ensure that there could be no organized opposition to his regime (Immerman
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1982, 199). He prioritized the securing of his position of authority by using military
power against potential opposition within Guatemala. Paul P. Kennedy’s June 6, 1954
New York Times article reports that within days the new Castillo Armas government
swiftly labeled almost 2,000 people who opposed him as “communists” (Kennedy, New
York Times, June 6, 1954). So many people were arrested that jails were overloaded and
so concentration camps had to be set up.
Immerman recounts that Castillo Armas proclaimed July 12 as Anti-Communist
Day. Accordingly he announced his personal intention to use the law to publicly execute
criminals and people who were found responsible, as an example for future generations to
know “crimes against freedom are crimes against the fatherland” (Immerman 1982,
p 198). There was actually no legal basis in Guatemalan law for prosecuting citizens for
simply holding political beliefs. With the repeal of the 1945 constitution and his “political
statute” (Immerman 1982, p 199) in place, with both legislative and executive powers
under his control, nothing stood in his way. Jonas writes that the United States now
proceeded to directly supervise a “wide-ranging witch hunt and McCarthy-style repression campaign” (Jonas 2012, p 309). Castillo Armas would then intimidate and eliminate
possible enemies by removing the rule of law and intensifying the anti-communist witch
hunt.
According to the National Security Archive, the last stage of PBSUCCESS was a
“roll-up of Communists and collaborators” (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997). In carrying
forward this anti-communist program Castillo Armas created a National Committee for
Defense against Communism. This Committee conducted surveillance, arrested people
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who were deemed to be dangerous, and deported foreigners even without the legal
recourse of a trial (Immerman 1982, p 199).
To aid in these efforts, Castillo Armas formed a special police force which was led
by José Bernabe Linares, the man who had done the same job in the pre-revolutionary
Ubico regime. Bernabe Linares was said to have used electric shock baths or a headshrinking steel skullcap in his methods as the “enforcer” for the dictatorial Ubico
(Immerman 1982, p. 199). Under Castillo Armas’ leadership Bernabe Linares went on to
investigate anyone in Guatemala who had ever been a member of a union, anyone who
had signed a petition, or anyone who had received a homestead during Arbenz’s tenure.
This resulted in the creation of police files on tens of thousands of people.
According to Immerman, thousands of people were arbitrarily jailed during this
time for purposes of “security” (Immerman 1982, p 199). The National Security Archive
says that after the CIA installed Castillo Armas into power, hundreds of Guatemalans
were rounded up and killed. Jonas puts the post-coup repression campaign death toll at
some 8,000 people. She estimates that thousands more people went into hiding or were
exiled from Guatemala (Jonas 2012, p 309). Numerous scholarly works indicate that
many Guatemalans were executed and many simply “disappeared”.
On another matter of great significance, that of land reform, one of Castillo
Armas’ first official acts was to return to the United Fruit Company 99 percent of the land
which had been expropriated from it. Castillo Armas also did away with taxes on interest, dividends, and profits which would have been payable (Immerman 1982, p 198).
Immerman recounts that Castillo Armas gave the national farms back to the state, and

88

took back land–often forcibly–from peasants who had acquired it through Decree 900.
Castillo Armas also got rid of cooperatives.
As part of Castillo Armas’ crafting of a new agrarian reform program, the United
States now helped with advice and money (Immerman 1982, p 198). Details of this plan
assured that private property would be exempted from expropriation. This exemption
meant that the only land available for distribution to the masses of people was stateowned land or land that was either undeveloped, inaccessible or of poor quality
(Immerman 1982, p 198). According to economic historian and sociologist Andre
Gunder Frank, using the land distribution program proposed during the post-Arbenz years
(1955-1961), taking into account a zero population growth, it would have taken “148
years for all peasant families to receive some land” (Frank 1969, p 270).
In her work on the effects of political violence on popular organizations during
this same time period, May writes that “Because the organized urban and rural working
classes were a key support of the Revolution, Carlos Castillo Armas dismantled the labor
organizations almost immediately upon his arrival into Guatemala City” (May 2001, p 4).
May claims that “Within a week of the fall of the Revolution, Castillo Armas replaced the
head of the Department of Labor” (May 2001, p 4). Immerman notes that Castillo
Armas cancelled the registrations of over 500 unions (Immerman 1982, p 199).
“While this did not outlaw the actual organizations, it did invalidate their leadership and the organizational structure (i.e., their
constitutions, autonomous internal procedures, and leadership).
The law stated that the affected labor organizations were allowed
three months to restructure themselves and to remove communists
from their membership…This prohibited a resurgence of the former unions after the three-month ‘trial period’ “(May 2001, p 4-5).

89

With these changes came disruption of leadership in the organizations, their constitutions
and their internal procedures. This disorganization in effect dismantled the political
institutions of popular organizations such as labor unions, agrarian committees and
political parties. In comparison to Arbenz’s last year in office, these changes negatively
impacted union membership as it declined to 10 percent of what it was, by the end of the
decade (Immerman 1982, p 200). It was not long until major labor organizations,
cultural organizations and other popular organizations were actually outlawed through
Decree 48. Not only did Castillo Armas cancel over 500 union registrations, he also
revoked Arévalo’s 1947 Labor Code (Immerman 1982, 199). Further, Castillo Armas
created a law which put future union charter approval under his Committee for Defense
against Communism (Immerman 1982, p 199-200).
In Jonas’ description of the immediate aftermath of this new government, she also
acknowledges the quick reversal of previous land reform and labor laws. She agrees that
under Castillo Armas’ leadership political parties and pro-revolution organizations were
made illegal. She relates that even literacy programs were seen to be part of “procommunist indoctrination” (Jonas 2012, p 309). This is particularly noteworthy as a July
1954 New York Times article reports of another new decree in the immediate post-Arbenz
presidency era–that of limiting suffrage to persons who were literate. The new Guatemalan leadership considered literacy as fundamental to authentic democracy, and it noted
literacy as one characteristic of responsible citizenship. This same Times article reports
that 73 percent of the Guatemalan population was illiterate at the time this decree was
enacted (New York Times, July 7, 1954). It is not difficult to understand that the effect of
this decree would exclude the majority population from being able to vote.
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The repressive and undemocratic changes instituted by Castillo Armas, which we
have noted took place with the aid of the U.S. Government, were not readily accepted by
the majority population of Guatemala. This can be seen through a news article written
two years into Guatemala’s “liberation” under the Castillo Armas regime. Reporter
David Graham describes conditions in Guatemala at the time in The Nation in his July
1956 article (Graham, Nation, July 14, 1956). He points out again that Castillo Armas
had led by the pre-1956 Constitution, executive decrees. Graham likens this to recent
elections where only seven percent of the Guatemalan people chose to vote. He notes
Castillo Armas’ ability to clamp down on the press, and also the new Constitution allowing him to cancel civil liberties.
Graham reports that even the “government’s hand-picked labor leaders are crying
out against government policies” as witnessed by labor leader L.F. Balcarcel’s May Day
speech printed in Prensa Libre. This labor leader acknowledged that labor and agrarian
laws had aggravated problems such as scarcity of land and scarcity of work (Graham,
Nation, July 14, 1956). Graham considered existing working conditions under the
Castillo Armas regime as shocking. He reports that in rural areas hundreds of small
farmers were forced off their lands. This cut production of corn and beans, the basic
foods eaten by Guatemalans. Graham reveals that landowners seized the property of the
peasants by burning them out. He recounts an example published in Time’s June 11 Latin
American edition when 32 dislocated peasants had appealed to the authorities about their
need to plant corn to feed their families. When the meeting took place the Indians were
surrounded by the town’s police chief and officers, and the mayor. They were trucked off
and charged with being communists. One of the large landowners who had dispossessed
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them of their land was a minister in the government. The point that Graham makes with
this example is that respectful pleas were struck down by government tribunals as
“Communist agitation”.
In this same July 1956 article, Graham chronicles existing conditions which
include the dissolution of Congress, the whittling down of the electorate, and laws passed
against “dangerous thoughts”. He refers to United Fruit Company as “Central America’s
traditional boss”. Graham acknowledges the solidarity which exists between those who
put Castillo Armas in power, foreign capital and domestic feudalism. He says that during
Castillo Armas’ reign these relationships had become more concrete.
Graham expounds that the Arévalo-Arbenz regimes had been intensely nationalistic and hence suspicious of the United States. This, he says, comes as a consequence of
what people who are “south of the border” universally believe, that the United States had
been controlling and exploiting Central America for sixty years. He describes the liberation as being “hoisted into the saddle by U.S. intervention (emphasis mine) and secured
with good old-fashioned fascist decrees” (Graham, July 14, 1956). The Nation reporter
ponders what kind of labor movement might exist in the United States if union leadership
had to be cleared by Senator McCarthy.
Graham describes the Guatemalan army as a police force which “has been armed
to the teeth by Dulles under the ludicrous pretext that it can help the defense of the
continent”. He mentions that fortunately there are “sizeable military elements who stand
ever ready to make lightning adjustments to political change” (Graham, July 14, 1956).
Under these conditions Graham conjectures whether or not, in light of public demonstra-
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tions at Easter time, on May Day and in June, Castillo Armas might be asking himself:
“How loyal is the army?”
According to Graham, two years into Castillo Armas’ leadership, the Guatemalan
Bar Association was sensing a change in the politics of Guatemala. Graham recounts a
prominent businessman’s observation that the “dictator’s prestige has never been lower”
and that politicians who aren’t already committed to Castillo Armas wouldn’t go near
him. The businessman goes on to venture that if United States’ support for Castillo Armas
were to be withdrawn, then the government would collapse. Graham concludes his article
by referring to Castillo Armas as the man who is regarded by both friends and enemies
alike as the “chief instrument of Yankee intervention (emphasis mine)” (Graham, Nation,
July 14, 1956).
Under these conditions it is not difficult to understand that President Castillo
Armas was assassinated one year later, in 1957. The assassination took place in the
National Palace and was carried out by one of his previous bodyguards. In response to
the news, President Eisenhower announced that the assassination was a loss not only for
Guatemala but for the world. He even sent his own son, John Eisenhower, to attend the
funeral.

Guatemala Was Not Always Militarized

Richard N. Adams notes in his Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan
National Social Structure, 1944-1966, that the United States was a crucial ally of the
Guatemalan military. He specifies support came from U.S. diplomatic, commercial and
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military communities (Adams 1970, p 260). We have explored economic/commercial and
diplomatic elements in the previous chapters. We will now consider the buildup of the
military in Guatemala during this early Cold War period.
In looking at the military in Latin American countries, Adams counters the
erroneous belief which many people hold that these nations had been under military
governments ever since they gained their independences. In his view, this assumption
obscures how fast the militaries of Latin American countries grew in more recent years.
In the case of Guatemala, Adams clarifies that while Ubico was a dictator, this does not
mean that Ubico’s was a military government (Adams 1970, p 238). In Adams’ assessment, the structure of the Guatemalan military after the Ubico regime developed, took on
a new role in Guatemala–this with particular involvement by the United States (Adams
1970, p 238).
Before we consider this accelerated growth of the military in Guatemala, we will
first look at the time period prior to World War II. According to Adams, it was during
this time that there was a running feud between landowners and the military. Labor was
in short supply during this time (Adams 1970, p 259). An accessible source of men was
available in the rural labor force. Landowners needed laborers for use in their agricultural work. The Guatemalan army also needed men and preferred to draft these men into the
military. Because of the competing needs, Adams asserts that at this time landowners
viewed the military as a parasite (Adams 1970, p 259).
Cold War ideology soon brought the landowners and the military together as
perceptions of a communist threat were projected onto Guatemala–this in spite of the
claim by Immerman that the communist movement in Guatemala in the 1940s and 1950s
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was actually weak. He discerns that by enacting anti-reform programs which were
harmful to the Guatemalan masses, the efforts to reverse the reform movement had
actually “fueled the very communist movement that the Eisenhower administration
overestimated in 1954” (Immerman 1982, p 200).
Adams notes that the United States had worked semi-openly in Guatemalan
government affairs since the time of Estrada Cabrera. One indicator of this was U.S.
involvement in Guatemala’s Escuela Politécnica, its military academy. This academy is
the place where future officials of the Guatemalan Army (Ejército de Guatemala) were
trained. He points out that by the early 1930s this school was headed up by an American
military officer (Adams 1970, p 260). The United States had been concerned about the
defense of the Panama Canal during World War II and so it had a large military presence
in Guatemala. U.S. military attachés and mission officers had been stationed in
Guatemala since that time–even during the Ten Years of Spring (Adams 1970, p 260).
The military presence in Guatemala developed over time. This grew through what
Adams calls the “assumption of regnancy”. He describes this as part of growing
corporateness and continuing politicization of the military in the affairs of government
(Adams 1970, p 262-263) as the military took more responsibility in the ruling of the
country. Military involvement was not new as Adams explains. Part of Guatemala’s
recent past included using the army to augment the police, as well as a substitute for the
police (Adams 1970, p 263). This demonstrates that the Guatemalan military was
involved in leadership in the country in the past, and this participation increased since
1944 (Adams 1970, p 263-264).
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There was not complete acceptance in Guatemala of U.S. influence however.
Around the time that Arbenz was ousted from his Presidency, ambivalence began in the
Guatemalan military toward the United States. During this period the Guatemalan
military was becoming dependent upon a continued supply of U.S. arms and training, but
this dependence ran counter to the nationalistic pride of Guatemalan military officers
(Adams 1970, p 260). The military saw part of the problem through the manner in which
Castillo Armas came to be the leader of Guatemala. Military members felt that they had
played a major role in the collapse of Arbenz as they had refused to come to the aid of
Arbenz during the liberation. Because of this, military personnel believed that they had
the right to choose who would succeed Arbenz in the presidency. As was noted previously, the United States had not only handpicked Castillo Armas but it had orchestrated the
coup which put him into power. This antagonized the Guatemalan military and especially
the Liberation Army which was used to install Castillo Armas (Adams 1970, p 260-261).
Even so, they realized that the United States supported Castillo Armas, and the army was
dependent upon the United States as a source of aid.
Technical and material aid from the United States to Guatemala after the liberation caused drastic changes in the structure of the Guatemalan state. Jonas asserts that the
United States was directly involved in this restructuring (Jonas 1991, p 57). The increasing military support from the United States altered the previously existing power structure. U.S. military expenditures in Guatemala allowed those entities who received this
support to expand their power and internal control. This resulted in an increased role for
the military in central government. What evolved was a class-based corporate state
headed up by the bourgeoisie and the armed forces. Control by the bourgeoisie was
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indirect while at the same time the armed forces came to dominate operation of the state
(Jonas 1991, p 57). This new arrangement was designed to defend the interests of the
bourgeoisie (including transnational capital) while using the support of the armed forces,
some of whose upper echelons became part of the bourgeoisie.

Counterinsurgency Begins

Because of hopes and expectations which many Guatemalans had experienced
during the Ten Years of Spring, history could not be reversed. Graham notes that the
Arévalo-Arbenz administrations gave Guatemalan people a sense of worth and selfrespect (Graham, Nation, July 14, 1956). Jonas discerns that the same structural dynamics and conditions which existed for the majority of the Guatemalan people, the conditions which had caused the Revolution, still existed in the post-1954 period (Jonas 2012,
p 310). The majority Guatemalan population saw their hopes dashed while better conditions presented themselves for the large landowners and foreign companies. It was not
difficult to understand how an insurgency would develop in response to the changing
conditions in Guatemala.
Jonas describes two political imperatives of the counterrevolution: to enable
conditions for private investment, and also to drive out and do away with possibilities of
future mobilization by popular organizations (Jonas 1991, p 59). In order to subdue the
masses from mobilizing, a massive counterinsurgency campaign was developed by
Guatemalan military leaders, this again with the aid of the United States (Doyle and
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Kornbluh, 1997). Jonas describes U.S. influence in establishing the counterinsurgency
state as being “formative and decisive” (Jonas 1991, p 117).
Democratic institutions were militarized with nearly all of Guatemala’s presidents
after 1954 coming from military backgrounds (Jonas 1991, p 61). Power came to be
effectively held by the military. At the local level, Military Zones were established using
“military commissioners”–many of whom were former army personnel. According to
Jonas, each town had representatives which in turn were part of a larger network. In
their new posts as paramilitary forces they were entrusted to safeguard the interests of the
rural property owners (Jonas 1991, p 61-62). These people spied on the local population
and carried out vigilante activities. The courts were militarized. With this militarization
of politics, indirect rule was established for the Guatemalan bourgeoisie along with
foreign investors (Jonas 1991, p 62). This was done using the private sector political
representation of a coordinating committee called Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones
Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (Jonas 1991, p 62). According to
Jonas this was top-down authoritarian representation and it excluded popular participation (Jonas 1991, p 62). Overall, the military came to be a leading force in governance.
Jonas says that this resulted in the loss of democracy which in time was replaced with
outright terror (Jonas 1991, p 62).
In looking at the funding of this system, Jonas observes that in the mid-1950s
U.S. aid to foreign countries was not yet common (Jonas 1991, p 57). Adams reports that
the United States didn’t give much military support to Guatemala during World War II or
even up until Arbenz was deposed (Adams 1970, p 264). In looking at U.S. Department
of Defense data regarding aid from the United States to Guatemala between 1956 and
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1964, Adams notes that aid was considered relatively low at $0.4 million dollars until
1961. This was very early in the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996). In 1962, U.S. aid
more than tripled to $1.3 million, and that number doubled to $2.6 million in 1963. This
is according to the United States Department of Defense. (Adams 1970, p 264: U.S.
Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts, 15 February 1965). Adams asserts
that “ it can hardly be a coincidence that the first time in recent Guatemalan history a
military government has taken over the entire control of the country occurred after it had
received some millions of dollars worth of equipment from the United States” (Adams
1970, p 264).
It is not within the scope of this thesis to chronicle the 36 years of the civil war.
From previous chapters we can see a progression of U.S. intervention going from effects
in economic and political areas of Guatemala, to now acknowledging official approval by
the United States in funding of military operations in Guatemala. All of this took place
within the context of the Cold War.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions

This thesis has focused on effects of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. intervention on
Guatemala in three areas: economic policy, Cold War rationale, and military operations.
We have considered a number of perspectives on Guatemala-U.S. interactions in the mid20th century. From these we will now look at the aforementioned three elements
singularly and also collectively to determine if U.S. influence and intervention
contributed to and facilitated the establishment of a counterinsurgency state in
Guatemala.

Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy and Intervention

Economic and the 1954 Coup d’état. We will first assess U.S. influence and
intervention surrounding the 1954 coup d’état in Guatemala. In reexamining the history
of the coup with an eye toward U.S. intervention, Schlesinger and Kinzer use FOIA
information to actually detail efforts by the United States to remove the Guatemalan
revolutionary government. In the title of their book they even name this political action
as an “American coup” (Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in
Guatemala). Of major concern for Schlesinger and Kinzer in looking at the deposing of
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Arbenz during the coup were economic interests–most particularly interested parties in
the United States like those of the United Fruit Company (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990,
p 19). Chalmers Johnson writes that the U.S. CIA planned and organized the 1954
military coup in Guatemala as a result of modest land reform which threatened U.S.
corporations (Johnson 2000, p 13-14).
Johnson sees this as a “striking example of American imperial policies” in its
backyard (Johnson 2000, p 13). Ronning’s assessment agrees with Johnson’s as he writes
that Latin American states tried to protect themselves from intervention which was
“protect(ing) powerful economic interests” in its “imperialistic designs” (Ronning 1961,
p 250). The major country from which they were defending themselves against
intervention is identified by Ronning as the United States. Guatemala is just one country
which dealt with the problem of intervention in the Western Hemisphere.
The ideas of the man whom Smith identifies as the chief architect of the U.S.
Soviet containment policy, George Kennan, acknowledged three goals of the United
States. Latin America was considered by U.S. producers as a major potential export
market, as well as an area for financial investment. Kennan noted the desire to protect
what he already considered to be “our (emphasis mine) raw materials” (Smith 2008,
p 121). These ideas underlay U.S. foreign policy and rationale for intervention in
Guatemala.
One person with first-hand knowledge of both the coup and the economic effects
of the United States on Guatemala was former President Juan Jose Arévalo, who served
during the first years of the revolutionary period from 1945-1951. In the early 1960s
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Arévalo wrote the book The Shark and the Sardines. In this book Arévalo characterizes
Latin America as “easy prey” and the “immediate victim” of big business through the
changing North America (Arévalo 1961, p 10). He mentions that Latin Americans were
looked upon as “braceros” (Arévalo 1961, p 10-11) essentially day laborers or hired
hands. Latin Americans, he said, were exploited with shrewdness, coldness, harshness
and great arrogance (Arévalo 1961, p 11). He says that as a consequence of this, Latinos
migrated to the North. Progress in Latin America was halted as the United States became
great.
Arévalo says that Latin Americans have a different identity than the “businessman
mentality” (Arévalo 1961, p 12) and because they are different, they want to be accepted
as they are. With indignation he declares that “international treaties are a farce when they
are pacted between a Shark and a sardine” (Arévalo 1961, p 13). This allegory regards
the United States as the shark and Latin American countries as sardines. Arévalo denounces diplomatic systems which serve the interests of the shark. Likewise he denounces hemispheric legal devices which inevitably lead to imperialism. He says that the White
House is subordinate to business and the U.S. military has been converted to being
policemen for big business. He observes that wealth is siphoned out of the South to the
North. Arévalo recognized–even in the early 1960s– that interests of millionaires in the
United States are not necessarily even tied to the United States.
From the perspective of former Guatemalan President Arévalo and many scholars
and news writers we can see that U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala’s
economy and through the 1954 coup did indeed change and redirect the Guatemalan
national government and as a result the lives of the Guatemalan people. The CIA
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effectively removed the Arévalo government and replaced it with one headed by a leader
of its own choosing– Castillo Armas. This change redirected governmental efforts away
from priorities like revolutionary land and labor reforms, and toward efforts which could
be more easily maneuvered. One such example is noted in Guatemala: Never Again! as
it describes the Guatemalan Army’s strategy to “militarize the social fabric” (Guatemala:
Never Again! 1999, p xxxiii) through forced recruitment of Guatemalans into Civilian
Self-defense Patrols. The REHMI report states that this strategy “dragged the civilian
population into war” as it militarized their daily lives. Regarding the impact of
militarization the report indicates that “people’s lives were transformed into a
battleground” (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xxxiii).
Schlesinger and Kinzer contend, because of the coup, that in the long-run
American interests were damaged in Guatemala. The authors write that antitrust
legislation affected the United Fruit Company as in 1958 it accepted a consent decree and
was thus forced to cut back on business in Guatemala and give up some of its land
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, 229). It also had to give up ownership in the railroad.
Ultimately, the United Fruit Company sold the rest of its land holdings to the Del Monte
corporation. By the 1970s UFCO merged into United Brands Company (Schlesinger and
Kinzer 1990, 229). I would seem that the effects of UFCO on the Guatemalan economy
and internal politics outlived the company itself.

Cold War and Communist Containment. This section will include an
assessment of the effects of U.S. foreign policy and intervention on Guatemala through
Cold War rhetoric. Part of the title of Immerman’s book about Guatemala indicates that
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its subject matter deals with the CIA and U.S. “Foreign Policy of Intervention”. In this
book the author provides background on U.S. foreign interests and Latin American policy
within the framework of the Cold War. Through the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, Immerman assesses the road to intervention.
Diplomatic historian Cullather says it was Cold War concerns which convinced
President Eisenhower to have another President–Arbenz– forcefully removed from office
through Operation PBSUCCESS (Doyle and Kornbluh 1997, Document 5). Peter H.
Smith looks at U.S. political leadership in the Americas during this time. In his book he
recognizes that Latin America was turned into a “battleground” through conflicts between
capitalism and communism (Smith 2008, p 113).
Johnson recognizes that it was both superpowers which used Cold War rhetoric to
try to justify their actions against smaller states (Johnson 2000, p 27). Ronning also
observes the use of Cold War propaganda by both the United States and the USSR as they
each professed a life of abundance under their respective political and economic systems
(Ronning 1961, p 259).
Clearly there is agreement that Cold War policies had much to do with some of
the changes in the governance of Guatemala. This can be attested to in Guatemala
Memory of Silence. The Conclusions section of the report writes of underlying causes of
armed confrontation, and follows that up with information on the role of the United
States through the Cold War and National Security Doctrine. According to the report, the
United States provided support for strong military regimes in what it considered to be its
strategic backyard (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13). With
respect to Guatemala, the report says that U.S. training was provided for the Guatemalan
104

military officer corps in counterinsurgency techniques. Military assistance reinforced the
Guatemalan intelligence apparatus. The report concludes that these were key factors in
human rights violations throughout the armed confrontation (Guatemala Memory of
Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13).
Guatemala was but one of many countries which was affected by U.S.
anticommunist rhetoric (Johnson 2000, p 27). Johnson writes of the existence of
propaganda apparatuses which disguised the “true roots of revolt” from their own people.
He goes further and contends that the idea of communism in Central America is
“essentially absurd” (Johnson 2000, p 27). Smith’s ideas are similar as he asserts that the
fear of a “Soviet menace” was one which was greatly exaggerated (Smith 2008, 114).

Militarization of Guatemala. In looking at the expanding role of the
Guatemalan military in the mid-20th century, Adams reviews conditions which
contributed to this increase. One such condition was the technical and military aid from
the U.S. military. This aid increased the power of the Guatemalan central government
(Adams 1970, p 263-264). As was detailed previously by Adams, during World War II
and the years before Arbenz was deposed, the United States gave relatively little support
to the military establishment in Guatemala. Changes in U.S. rationale for involvement
were soon to come.
Adams observes that in 1959, according to the Mutual Security Act, if internal
security of Latin American countries was involved, Presidential approval was necessary
as the basis of military assistance programs. The improvement of internal national
security in Latin American countries was actually one method the United States used in
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its anti-communist efforts. In looking at changing rationale for U.S. military assistance
programs to Latin America, Adams reports that in 1964 the State Department now
understood that “. . . this administration is seeking to orient the military assistance
program in Latin America away from the outmoded concept of hemispheric defense
toward greater emphasis on meeting the internal subversive threat” (Adams 1970, p 264265).
Military expenditures show documented increases, as seen through the doubling
of U.S. aid to Guatemala from 1960 to 1961, its tripling between 1961 to 1962, and
doubling again from 1962 to 1963 (Adams 1970, p 264, U.S. Department of Defense,
Military Assistance Facts, 15 February 1965). Through this we see a shifting of
rationale and increase in involvement in the internal affairs of Guatemala. This shifting
U.S. rationale from anti-communist rhetoric, to what was then considered “internal
subversive threat(s),” is representative of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in
Guatemala. This was U.S. involvement not only in deposing the leader of Guatemala, but
now in the internal governance of that country.
In considering the Cold War within the Third World, Kennedy examines the arms
race between the two blocs and the resultant creation of military alliances to support
either side (Kennedy 1987, p 383). This U.S.-Soviet rivalry created a competition to find
new partners, or alternatively to prevent Third World countries from allying themselves
with the other competing power (Kennedy 1987, p 388). In Kennedy’s view, in the years
after World War II, America was more involved in this activity than the USSR. This he
attributed to what he said was a U.S. advantage over the USSR in that the Soviets were
then occupied in a post-war rebuilding mode.
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Smith writes of Kennan’s conception of U.S. goals to prevent military
exploitation of Latin America by whomever the United States considered to be its enemy
(Smith 2008, p 121). Within these efforts the United States placed increasing emphasis
on establishing contacts within the militaries of Latin American countries. The United
States used its anti-communist stance to institutionalize military and political alliances
within the Americas. In so doing, Arévalo claimed that the military apparatus
manipulated a new system of local “revolutions” (Arévalo 1961, p 11). He posits that
these were financed by Wall Street or the White House, which he viewed to have evolved
to become one and the same. If people tried to deal with the companies or the bankers,
Arévalo contended that the U.S. response was to send in the Marines.
In regards to Latin America as part of the Third World, Smith notes the United
States acted both from the outside and also through interventions inside domestic politics
of Latin American nations. Implicit in this was the understanding that Latin American
countries would simply have to accept change to ensure their own survival (Smith 2008,
p 134). Leadership in the United States alleged that revolution could potentially lead to
Marxist/communist gain; Guatemala was one country in which the United States
preferred to prevent revolution. Smith maintains that the U.S. Government emphasized
that Latin American countries were to accept the notion of gradual reform and not
revolution. Revolution was seen by leadership in the United States as dangerous, as it
destroyed political institutions and upset social order (Smith 2008, p 134).
Morgenthau also recognized the foreign policy goal of the United States to
maintain the status quo. In his letter to the New York Times editor, Morgenthau wrote that
the United States had become the “foremost counterrevolutionary status quo power on
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earth” (New York Times, October 10, 1974, p 46). Likewise Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
put forth that the intention of national policies is to seek to preserve the status quo
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). They note that Morgenthau gives the Monroe
Doctrine as an example of a policy which was designed to maintain the status quo
balance in the Western hemisphere (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 78).
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff write that national policies are also designed to achieve
expansion through imperialism (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). Kennedy states
that western imperialists accepted nationalism and self-determination for certain
countries and “civilized” people (e.g. eastern Europeans) but these principles were not
acceptable where the “imperialist powers extended their territories and held down
independence movements” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). Guatemala is not alone as a country
in which the United States extended its influence as it held down popular efforts toward
independence and reforms.
Schlesinger and Kinzer’s work chronicles Guatemala-U.S. history in what they
deem to be some of the earliest uses of the U.S. CIA clandestine bureaucracy
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii). They describe how National Security objectives
were said to be directed against communist encroachment in the Western hemisphere, and
also toward promoting democratic ideologies within (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1990, p xii).
In contrast to this presumption of promotion of democratic ideals, Morgenthau describes
the United States as “repression’s friend” (Morgenthau, New York Times, October 10,
1974, p 46). In the New York Times Morgenthau writes that since the end of World War II
the United States had intervened “on behalf of conservative and fascist repression against
revolution and radical reform”. Smith acknowledges what he calls the exaggerated fear
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of the “Soviet menace” as being used by the United States to crush leftist and communist
governments. In so doing it collaborated with and supported authoritarian regimes
(Smith 2008, 113-114).
In looking at historical roots of what later turned into armed confrontation in
Guatemala, the Commission for Historical Clarification surmised that the Cold War and
U.S. National Security Doctrine “fed the armed confrontation” and militarization of the
Guatemalan state and society (Guatemala Memory of Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 13,
14 and 37). Immerman denotes the irony and legacy of the CIA’s PBSUCCESS as that
of actually producing the guerrilla struggle (Immerman 1982, p 200). He concludes that
through U.S. anti-communist policies, cold warriors had “returned to power the very
elements of society that had created the conditions that the 1944 revolution had tried to
eradicate” (Immerman 1982, p 197-198). Chomsky writes of U.S. engineering of the
1954 coup, which restored military rule, and resulted in Guatemala turning into what he
calls a literal hell on earth.
From this it can be observed that U.S. foreign policy and intervention influences
interplayed in political, economic, ideological and military aspects in Guatemala. In her
analysis of various U.S. interventions, Jonas points out that Central America is regarded
as part of the U.S. “backyard” and as such U.S. military and economic interests are
enabled through the power structures of those countries (Jonas 1991, p 8). Jonas’ analysis
uses strong language in describing U.S. intervention and foreign policy in Guatemala.
She asserts that the United States made Guatemala into “a test case of its ability to
suppress social revolution in Latin America”. Guatemalan history from 1954 to the 1980s
is described by Jonas as a “laboratory of counterrevolution” (Jonas 1991, p 9). She
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points out that for decades U.S. power played an essential role in Guatemala (Jonas 1991,
p 6). Jonas identifies three protagonists in Guatemala: the “rebels”, the “death squads”
who operate as part of the official security forces, and the United States (Jonas 1991, p 6).
Author Chomsky claims that the United States provided direct military assistance
and thereby facilitated those who tortured, murdered and brutalized the Guatemalan
people (Chomsky 1985, p 33). He emphasizes that Elliott Abrams actually blamed the
violence “on the guerrillas who were fighting the government” (Chomsky 1985, p 32).
Many Guatemalans fled to Mexico at the time and he reflects that the consequent
violence and resultant mass of people seeking refuge from the violence were the “price of
stability” (Chomsky 1985, p 32). Chomsky notes that the U.S. State Department reported
that democracy was on track, even in light of Americas Watch observations that
assassinations had doubled and abductions had quadrupled in Guatemala at the time
(Chomsky 1985, p 32).
As Jennifer Schirmer looks at Guatemala from 1944 and moving toward the
1970s, she sees a change in the Guatemalan military’s purpose going from internal and
external defense, to becoming the “locus of state power” (Schirmer 1998, p 7-8). In her
chapter on A Military View of Law and Security, Schirmer notes that “law, like ideology,
serves a belief system and interests about the proper order of things” (Schirmer 1998, p
125). She maintains that law can be used toward justice just as it can be used to invent
institutions which oppress. In dealing with political conflict, law can be used two ways.
Schirmer writes that it can be used coercively “to limit and absorb conflict to preserve the
status quo” or it can be used persuasively “to absorb or limit political conflict while
presenting a rule-of-law image internationally” (Schirmer 1998, 125-126). Militaries and
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nation-states can use conceptions of law both domestically and internationally to try to
legitimate their activity. This thesis has demonstrated such a use of conceptions in
attempts to legitimate U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala which ultimately
affected the internal governance of that sovereign nation.

U.S. Intervention: Not the Only Factor, But an Essential Factor

It is clear from official documentation that U.S. foreign policy, intervention and
provision of military expenditures and expertise were instrumental in moving Guatemala
along its path toward civil war. This is not to say that involvement by the United States
was the sole reason. During this time many countries were looking for economic and
military support from Washington (Kennedy 1987, p 388). Even so, Kennedy observes
that at this same time the Third World was coming of age, as they were ridding
themselves of the control of previous European empires. Many of these countries did not
want to become “mere satellites of a distant superpower, even if the latter could provide
useful economic and military aid” (Kennedy 1987, p 392). As leadership was changed in
Guatemala, so did the perspective of people in power as to whether they wanted to
receive economic or military support from Washington. Leadership which followed that
of Arévalo and Arbenz took its own direction, and so it is important to note that U.S.
foreign policy and intervention could hardly have been carried out without the
participation of Guatemalan nationals. That is not to downplay activity by the United
States which was not the only factor, but was an essential factor.
In regards to U.S. intervention there is nothing more convincing than an actual
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admission. It doesn’t get any clearer than a U.S. Ambassador actually admitting, and
admitting with pride, that he and a team of U.S. Government representatives intentionally
intervened to overthrow the government of the sovereign nation of Guatemala. This can
easily be seen in U.S. Senate Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the
Committee on the Judiciary, in regards to the “Communist Threat to the United States
through the Caribbean” (U.S. Senate, 1961: 865-866). In this investigation, American
Ambassador to Honduras, Whiting Willauer admitted that he worked with U.S.
Ambassadors from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, CIA operatives, and other U.S. highranking officers on a “team in working to overthrow the Arbenz government” (U.S.
Senate, 1961: 865-866). He testified that efforts toward the coup were based in
Honduras, and part of his duties were to keep Honduran leadership “in line”–that is, to
allow the revolutionary activity to continue, lest Honduras also be overthrown. A New
York Times article dated June 20, 1954 also notes regional cooperation in what
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello refers to as U.S.-supported “aggression”. Toriello
states that “Honduras and Nicaragua were guilty of aiding and abetting the attack” (Szulc
June 20, 1954, New York Times). According to Bowen, Willauer worked to maintain
hostility between the governments of Guatemala and Honduras.
In Willauer’s testimony about his efforts in assisting in U.S. anti-communist
efforts, Willauer proudly boasted of the role he played in the overthrow of the
Guatemalan Government. As part of this Investigation, CIA archived excerpts note in a
July 27, 1962 hearing, Willauer bragged that he received a telegram from CIA Director
Allen Dulles in which he told Willauer “in effect that the revolution could not have
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succeeded but for what I did”. Willauer also acknowledged receipt of another telegram
from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles which complimented him on his work (U.S.
Senate, 1961: 865-866).

Sovereignty Is Important

We have previously identified and defined several Political Science and
International Relations concepts. From Ronning’s definitions we understand that
sovereignty of the individual nation-state is considered to be an absolute right, one which
seeks to ensure full interior autonomy and independence from external forces (Ronning
1961, p 252). The Sixth International Conference of American States (1928) is clear:
“No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of another” (Ronning 1961, p 251).
Intervention in another nation-state is understood to be a threat to its independence. “If
that right is not consecrated and is not protected in absolute form, international juridical
harmony does not exist” (Ronning 1961, p 252).
From the various authors in this thesis, we have seen the interplay and negative
effects of the United States on the Guatemalan economy, effects of Cold War rhetoric and
ideology, and the effects of U.S. military aid on Guatemala. U.S. foreign policy and
intervention did indeed affect the governance of the sovereign nation of Guatemala.
Ronning goes as far as to allege that American governments are “well aware that they are
breaking the law when they resort to intervention” (Ronning 1961, p 269), this in spite of
his belief that American governments do regard principles of non-intervention as
fundamental to the inter-American system.
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In consideration of these non-intervention principles, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
posit that even Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of realism, “could envisage no
conception of national interest that would condone policies of mass extermination,
torture, and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian populations in war” (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff 2001, p 77). Results from unbiased international organizations which have
investigated the civil war have concluded that Guatemala was a case of genocide wherein
the majority of the killing was of innocent civilians, and was committed by the official
Guatemalan Government. This is attested to in Guatemala: Never Again! as it compares
its REMHI findings with those of the 1999 CEH, “Guatemala Memory of Silence”
report. REHMI demonstrates disproportionate blame as it assigns 89.7 percent of the
atrocities to the Guatemalan Government forces and their allied paramilitary bands, and
4.8 percent to the guerrillas (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi). The CEH report
attributes 93 percent of the atrocities to government forces/paramilitary bands, with only
three percent to the guerrillas. This Official Report of the Human Rights Office of the
Archdiocese of Guatemala points out further that acts of genocide were targeted against
Mayan communities (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi). The REHMI report
explains that we have come to know this information because of a decision made by the
U.S. administration to declassify and release sensitive documents. From these
documents, the REHMI report identifies the “unhelpful role of certain U.S. agencies
during the war” (Guatemala: Never Again! 1999, p xvi).

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff theorize that Morgenthau believed that ethics could
restrain political conduct. Their analysis posits that if international politics are framed in
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terms of power, in Morgenthau’s own words “we are able to judge other nations as we
judge our own” (Morgenthau 1978, p 11). Contrary to this, we have seen that during the
mid-20th century the United States helped to set up and to support the Guatemalan State,
from which the CEH report concludes:
“At no time during the internal armed confrontation did the
guerrilla groups have the military potential necessary to pose an
imminent threat to the State. The number of insurgent combatants
was too small to be able to compete in the military arena with the
Guatemalan Army, which had more troops and superior weaponry,
as well as better training and coordination” (Guatemala Memory of
Silence, 1999, Conclusions I. 24).
The Guatemalan Army was provided much of this training and weaponry by the United
States. From this we can understand that the United States, in looking after its own
sovereignty and national security, was complicit in the denial of these same principles to
the majority civilian population in Guatemala.

What Can Be Done With This Knowledge?

Chomsky puts forth that America tends to denounce the crimes of those it views
as enemies, even while it dismisses or attempts to justify its own crimes (Chomsky 1985,
p 2). He asks us to be honest about relations between the United States and what he calls
our southern neighbors. Chomsky is straightforward in his assessment that many people
live in self-deceit. He is hopeful that we can become cognizant that our actions may
contribute to oppression and misery elsewhere, resulting from “longstanding geopolitical
conceptions and institutional structures” (Chomsky 1985, p 2). In Chomsky’s view we
can learn truth about who we are and how we affect the world (Chomsky 1985, p 1). He
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has faith that those of us who have access to wealth and privilege, who can act freely
without fear of state terror, can help to bring about change to policies and institutions
(Chomsky 1985, p 1).
Following are examples of how people may inform themselves about effects of
U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Guatemala specifically. First, in considering the
immigration of certain groups to the United States, historical assessment and a
recognition of the effects of U.S. foreign policy could shed much light on why they came
and when they came. Measurement of trends of migration from Guatemala since the 1954
“liberation” and through the decades since that time could perhaps indicate causality in
the growing population of Guatemalans in the United States. Statistical Census data from
the United States, and Mexico, and other countries where there are large populations of
Guatemalans, could provide insight into what was happening concurrently–politically and
economically–in Guatemala as people left that country. Are these Guatemalans economic
migrants or are they war refugees? Could these immigrants be considered as part of what
Johnson defines as “blowback”, that is, “unintended consequences of policies that were
kept secret from the American people” (Johnson 2000, p 8)? A news release from the
U.S. Census Bureau with results of the 2010 U.S. Census indicates that the Guatemalan
population in the United States now surpasses one million people (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Census Bureau News, May 26, 2011). Answers to questions such as the
aforementioned would be valuable and necessary for Americans to have in order to
engage in informed, responsible and honest discussions about immigration reform. The
same type of investigation could be done through analysis of the effects of regional trade
agreements on migration over time.
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The second example comes from historical information available only since early
1999 regarding Guatemala during its civil war, which deals with numerous documents
which were declassified by the U.S. Government from the independent Historical
Clarification Commission. Some of these documents indicate U.S. involvement and
intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala leading up to and throughout the civil
war. About a month after the release of this information, U.S. President Bill Clinton
visited Guatemala City. While there he addressed the Guatemalan people with the
following words:
“It is important that I state clearly that support for military forces
or intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression of the kind described in the (Truth Commission) report
was wrong.” “And the United States must not repeat that mistake”
(Kettle, The Guardian March 11, 1999).
With these words President Clinton personally acknowledged and admitted wrongful acts
by the United States to the people of Guatemala. Even with this admission, the American
general public today seems unaware of U.S. involvement in Guatemalan internal affairs
during the mid-20th century.
It seems prudent for us as Americans to educate ourselves with details of
historical events which were not available to us–or were perhaps hidden from us,
according to some scholars–at the time they were happening. Like truth and
reconciliation commissions, we must first acknowledge what actually happened, before
we can move forward productively to work for principled and just change to policies and
institutions, as Chomsky envisions. Let us begin with honesty and a willingness to learn.
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